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Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative Fact-Findingt
CAITLIN E. BORGMANN*
It is traditionally assumed that the role of ascertaining and evaluating the social
facts underlying a statute belongs to the legislatures. The courts in turn are tasked
with deciding the law and must defer to legislative fact-finding on relevant issues of
socialfact. This simplistic formula, however, does not accurately describe the courts'
confused approach to legislative fact-finding. Although the courts often speak in terms
of deference, they follow no consistent or predictable pattern in deciding whether to
defer in a given case. Moreover, blanketjudicial deference to legislative fact-finding
would not be a wise general rule. Because social fact-finding plays a decisive role in
constitutional analysis, blind judicial deference would undermine the courts'
responsibility to protect basic individual rights and liberties. Judicial treatment of
legislative fact-finding is thus sorely in need of a coherent theory.
This Article proposes a new approach, a paradigm ofselective independent judicial
review of social facts. Under this model, the courts should independently review the
factualfoundation of legislation that curtails basic individual rights, even when those
rights do not receive strict or heightened scrutiny. This approach is unique in ensuring
a baseline protection for important individual rights, including emerging rights, while
respecting the division ofpower between the branches ofgovernment. The paradigm is
needed because, this Article asserts, legislatures are poorly positioned to gather and
assess facts dispassionately, especially when addressing laws that restrict
controversial or minority rights. The process offact-finding in federal trial courts
ensures a superiorfactual record when such rights are at stake. This Article illustrates
the courts' and legislatures' contrasting capacities for fact-finding through case
studies, including "partial-birth abortion, " gay parenting, and indecency on the
Internet. Moreover, the Article argues, because of the courts'traditional and vital role
in protecting basic individual rights, the proposed paradigm honors constitutional
structuralprinciples.
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INTRODUCTION
In the late 1990s, more than half of the states enacted "partial-birth abortion" bans.'
This tide of legislation reflected a shared conviction that doctors were performing
abortions by means of an especially gruesome, medically unnecessary procedure.2 Yet
nearly every trial court to consider a ban invalidated it on the grounds that it
unconstitutionally endangered women's health.3 These rulings were affirmed with near
unanimity. The Supreme Court agreed that the bans were unconstitutional. 4 This
striking divide between legislative and judicial outcomes on the bans stemmed from
one overriding dynamic: fact-finding. The bans' constitutionality depended upon
dubious factual conclusions about how abortions are performed and the availability of
alternative procedures. The legislatures did not uncover the weak factual footing, but-
through their independent review of the facts-the courts did.
Congress passed its own "partial-birth abortion ban" in 2003.5 Four years later, the
Supreme Court upheld the ban in Gonzales v. Carhart.6 In a sharp reversal, the Court
this time deferred to Congress on the key medical issues in dispute (although it
formally disavowed any such deference).7 Like the state legislatures, Congress had
concluded that its ban did not endanger women's health, and it made these findings
explicit in the statute. The Supreme Court's de facto deference to Congress on this key
issue proved decisive, sparking debate over whether deference was appropriate in this
context.
It is traditionally assumed that the role of ascertaining and evaluating the facts
underlying a statute belongs to the legislatures. The courts, in turn, are tasked with
1. Thirty-one states have enacted at least one "partial-birth abortion" ban. Am. Civil
Liberties Union, Abortion Bans: In the States, http://aclu.org/reproductiverights/abortionbans/
12544res20051007.html (information compiled in Februrary 2006).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 125-36.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 151-57.
4. See Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart 1), 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
5. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006).
6. (Carhart I1), 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
7. See id. at 1637; see infra text accompanying notes 164,286-89 (discussing Carhart I1).
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deciding the law, while deferring to legislatures' assessment of the relevant social facts.
This simplistic formula, however, does not capture the Supreme Court's incoherent
approach to legislative fact-finding.8 Nor would it make an acceptable general rule. 9
Because the determination of social facts is nearly always decisive in constitutional
decision making, blanket judicial deference would undermine the courts' crucial
responsibility for protecting basic individual rights. The courts' approach to legislative
fact-finding is thus in need of a lucid and sound theory. Not surprisingly, the Court's
treatment of legislative fact-finding has received considerable recent attention among
scholars. Several have argued for deference, criticizing the Court's close scrutiny of
congressional fact-finding in the Enforcement and Commerce Clause contexts;' 0 some
have suggested that deference is to be avoided where fundamental or "specially
protected" rights are at stake;" others have argued that deference is inappropriate in all
contexts. 12
This Article proposes a paradigm of selective independent judicial review of social
facts. I argue that courts should independently review the factual foundation of all
legislation that curtails important individual rights protected by the federal
Constitution, regardless of whether the Supreme Court has held those rights to be
"fundamental" or has deemed them to merit strict or heightened scrutiny. As the Court
has moved further and further from neat distinctions between different levels of rights
and the tiers of legal scrutiny applicable to laws infringing those rights, it makes less
8. See infra Part I.A. I use "legislative fact-finding" to mean fact-finding conducted by a
legislature. I do not use it to denote a court's finding of so-called "legislative facts," also
referred to as "social facts" (and contrasted with "adjudicative" or "historical" facts, which are
the facts particular to the litigants and the dispute before a court). See DONALD L. HOROwITZ,
THE CouRTS AND SOcIL. POLICY 45 (1977); see also Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to
Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARv. L. REv. 364 (1942)
(distinguishing between "legislative" and "adjudicative" facts); cf. Peggy C. Davis, "There Is a
Book Out... ": An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1590, 1600 (1987) (using "legislative fact-finding" to refer to a court's findings of legislative
facts). For clarity, I avoid the term "legislative fact" and use exclusively "social fact."
Legislative fact-finding by nature addresses social facts, which Donald Horowitz defines as "the
recurrent patterns of behavior on which policy must be based." HOROwrrz, supra, at 45.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See, e.g., A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The
Supreme Court's New "On The Record" Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86
CORNELL L. REv. 328, 332-39 (2001); William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative
Record Review, 54 STAN. L. REv. 87 (2001); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing
Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80 (2001); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-
Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARv. L. REv. 5 (2001); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel,
Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78
ND. L.J. 1, 11-12 (2003).
11. David L. Faigman, Ashutosh A. Bhagwat & Kathryn M. Davis, Amicus Brief of
Constitutional Law Professors David L. Faigman andAshutosh A. Bhagwat, et al. in the Case
ofGonzales v. Carhart, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 69, 72 (2006) (arguing that Court should
apply "searching, independent review ... to all fundamental and other specially protected
rights").
12. See John 0. McGinnis & Charles W. Mulaney, Judging Facts Like Law: The Courts
Versus Congress in Social Fact-Finding, 25 CoNsT. COMMENT. (forthcoming 2008), available
at http://ssm.com/abstract=-1061502.
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and less sense to rely upon these outdated categories in establishing a paradigm for
judicial treatment of legislative fact-finding. Moreover, the Court's designation of
rights as fundamental or "specially protected" may lag behind a just conception of
basic individual rights and liberties. The Court may initially be tentative in recognizing
an emerging right and therefore may refrain from applying heightened scrutiny, even as
it recognizes that essential human rights values are at stake. 13 Because the rights that
are vital to human flourishing are not static, a theory ofjudicial review of legislative
fact-finding must be flexible enough to accommodate evolving rights, ensuring
baseline protection for such rights although their formal legal status may still be in
flux.14
Deference to legislative fact-finding has been based on two different principles.
First, there is a widely accepted view that legislative bodies are better than courts at
fact-finding.' 5 Second, courts and commentators have argued that courts lack the
authority or legitimacy to question legislative fact-finding.16 1 argue that legislatures
have in fact done a poor job of gathering and assessing facts in important cases and
that the structural shortcomings of the legislative fact-finding process are particularly
stark when laws restrict core personal rights and liberties.' 7 In contrast, the process of
fact-finding in federal trial courts ensures that they produce a superior factual record.'8
Moreover, I suggest that, because of the courts' vital role in protecting basic individual
rights, independent judicial fact-finding in these contexts honors constitutional
structural principles.19
Proponents of broad deference to legislative fact-finding often point to the Lochner
era to show the dangers of independent judicial review of social facts.20 But
independent judicial review need not be an all-or-nothing deal. My proposal takes into
account the federal courts' important responsibility to protect basic individual rights-
especially unpopular and minority rights-while respecting the division of power
between the legislatures and the courts. In particular, my approach would allow courts
to defer to legislative fact-finding when legislatures seek to protect or expand
individual rights.2' Moreover, it leaves open the question of whether courts should
defer to legislative fact-finding in cases where basic individual rights are not
implicated at all. At the same time, because I propose independent judicial review in
all cases of asserted basic individual rights, including those the Court has subjected
only to rational basis review, my paradigm accounts for emerging rights, such as the
rights of lesbian and gay adoptive parents.
Judicial deference to legislative fact-finding has not escaped scholarly critique.
Some scholars are wary of judicial deference to legislative fact-finding because the
13. See infra Part III.A.
14. See infra Part III.A.
15. See infra Part I.D.
16. See infra Part I.C.
17. See infra Part III.B; see also infra Part II.
18. See infra Part Ill.B; see also infra Part II.
19. See infra Part III.A.
20. See Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of
Rights, 84 1owA L. REv. 941, 949-52 (1999) (describing the standard critique of"Lochnerism,"
which holds that the Court improperly strayed from deference principles).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 243-55.
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doctrine often hinges upon a tendentious distinction between fact and law. These
scholars contend that the Court exploits the fact/law distinction to justify its preference
as to which branch of government should decide an issue.22 If the Court wants to
decide the issue, it characterizes the question as one of law. If it prefers to leave the
issue to Congress, the Court frames it as a question of fact. One solution to this
problem is forthrightly to declare everything to be a social fact and thereby to prevent
the Court from using the subterfuge of a fuzzy fact/law distinction to justify
realignments of constitutional power. Thus one recent article, arguing from the
positivist premise that "law is a social fact," asserts that, since courts are entrusted with
deciding law, they should be equally entrusted with deciding other kinds of social
facts. 23
This second approach, while helpful, tends to gloss over the distinct and important
category of social facts that underlie most constitutional decision making, facts I will
refer to as "dispositive" social facts.24 Dispositive social facts are the plainly
empirical-as opposed to doctrinal-issues that a decision maker must resolve before
determining a law's constitutionality: Do children suffer harm when raised by gay
parents? How are second- and third-trimester abortions practiced, and what are the
relative risks and safety advantages of different procedures? These kinds of questions
are not questions of law, policy, or morality.25 Dispositive social facts thus differ from
the social facts important to legal positivists, or what I will call "constitutive" social
facts, the facts that for positivists establish the basis of legality.26 The second criticism
of judicial deference to legislative fact-finding rests upon positivist assumptions and
foregoes a separate focus on dispositive social facts. But, setting aside the positivist
claim that the law is rooted in (constitutive) social fact, there is no question that current
constitutional analysis turns in significant part on dispositive social facts.27 While the
first criticism raises important questions about allocations of power in constitutional
22. See, e.g., Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope ofJudicial Review: A
Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1177-78 (2001); Saul M. Pilchen, Politics v. The
Cloister: Deciding When the Supreme Court ShouldDefer to Congressional Facofnding Under
the Post-Civil War Amendments, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 337, 340 (1984).
23. See McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 12.
24. David Faigman refers to these as "reviewable facts." See DAvID L. FAIGMAN,
CONsTITuTIONAL FICTIONs: A UNIFIED THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS 46, 52 (2008).
25. That is not to deny that they are often intricately intertwined with questions of morality
or policy. See infra Part I.A.
26. See generally Scott J. Shapiro, The "Hart-Dworkin " Debate: A Short Guide for the
Perplexed, in RONALD DwORKIN 22 (Arthur Ripstein ed., 2007). David Faigman discusses a
similar category of facts, which he calls "doctrinal facts." See FAIGMAN, supra note 24, at 46,
52.
27. See Dean M. Hashimoto, Science as Mythology in Constitutional Law, 76 OR. L. REV.
111, 120-21 (1997) (noting that, whether or not they adhere to fact/law distinction, most
scholars today recognize the influence of social legislative facts on constitutional decision
making); John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and
Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 485,488,490-91 (1986); Solove,
supra note 20, at 970-92. But see Hashimoto, supra, at 150 (arguing that the Supreme Court
"includes scientific facts in its constitutional law opinions mostly for their persuasive appeal and
symbolic expression"). For this reason, one might also call them "internal" social facts, since
they are internal to the existing legal process, rather than constitutive of it.
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interpretation, to highlight the Court's manipulation of the fact/law distinction does not
answer which governmental body should determine dispositive social facts. I argue
that, in our present system, the federal courts, and in particular federal trial courts, are
best equipped to find such facts, especially those underlying laws that curtail
controversial or minority rights.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes and analyzes the courts'
historical approach to legislative fact-finding, including the circumstances under which
courts have given deference and their justifications for doing so. Part II presents three
cases studies-the state and federal "partial-birth abortion" bans, gay parenting, and
indecency on the Intemet-that juxtapose legislative fact-finding with judicial fact-
finding in the context of laws challenged as unconstitutionally infringing basic
individual rights. Part III critiques the traditional approaches to legislative deference. It
argues that federal courts' responsibility to protect basic individual rights carries with it
a duty to examine independently the relevant social facts. Moreover, it contends that
federal trial courts are institutionally better fact-finders than legislatures, especially
where controversial or minority rights are at stake.28 Part IV proposes a new judicial
approach to legislative fact-finding and applies the proposal to the case studies
presented in Part II, as well as to Crawford v. Marion County Election Board29 and
Planned Parenthood v. Rounds,3 ° cases recently decided, respectively, by the Supreme
Court and the Eighth Circuit en banc.
I. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO LEGISLATiVE FACT-FINDING: A DOCTRINE IN DISARRAY
A. The Meaning of Judicial Deference to Legislative Fact-Finding
The federal courts have traditionally been reluctant fact-finders. They have certainly
disavowed preeminence in fact-finding, preferring to articulate their role, instead, as to
decide the law. 31 In keeping with this self-described role, federal courts have generally
deferred to congressional and state legislative fact-finding. 32 Federal courts have long
held that Congress's findings of empirical fact are entitled to judicial deference.33 In
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, for example, the Supreme Court stated that the Court
"must pay close attention to... the factfmding of Congress" and must "give 'great
28. This Article focuses primarily on the federal courts because many of their
characteristics-including that judges are appointed, that they serve life terms, and that the
Federal Rules of Evidence govern the proceedings-contribute to making federal courts a better
forum for fact-finding in the context of statutes that curb individual rights. To the extent that
some state courts share these (or similar) features, the arguments made here may apply to these
courts as well, and indeed some of the examples in the case studies that follow demonstrate this.
See infra Part III.
29. 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
30. 467 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 2006), vacated en banc, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008).
31. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Devins, supra note 22, at
1169-70.
32. For a helpful overview of the history ofjudicial deference to legislative fact-finding, see
generally Solove, supra note 20.
33. See Kramer, supra note 10, at 151-52 (explaining that courts have been "highly
respectful" of congressional fact-finding "at least since M'Culloch v. Maryland').
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weight to the decisions of Congress' regarding "'complex' empirical question[s]. ' 34
Similarly, in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (Turner Il), the Court stressed
the importance of "Congress' factfinding function" and declared that the Court "must
give considerable deference, in examining the evidence, to Congress' findings and
conclusions." 35
Courts have accorded similar deference to the factual findings of state legislatures.
As the Supreme Court declared in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., "States are
not required to convince the courts of the correctness of their legislative judgments.
Rather, 'those challenging the legislative judgment must convince the court that the
legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be
conceived to be true by the governmental decision maker.' 36 Indeed, the Court noted
that, so long as "there was evidence before the legislature reasonably supporting the
classification," legislation should not be invalidated even when its challengers
"tender[] evidence in court that the legislature was mistaken. 37 In Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co.,
the Court found that
The District Court's responsibility for making "findings of fact" certainly does not
authorize it to resolve conflicts in the evidence against the [state] legislature's
conclusion or even to reject the legislative judgment on the basis that without
convincing statistics in the record to support it, the legislative viewpoint
constitutes nothing more than what the District Court in this case said was "pure
speculation." 38
But a close examination of the cases addressing judicial deference to legislative fact-
finding, and of the circumstances under which such deference has been accorded or
denied, reveals a doctrine in disarray.39 First, the Supreme Court has been unclear
about the role facts should play in its constitutional decisions. At times the Court treats
34. 497 U.S. 547, 569,579-81 (1990) (quoting Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 103 (1973)), overruled by Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200 (1995).
35. 520 U.S. 180, 199 (1997). The Court's deference to Congress's fact-finding in Turner
H contrasted with the plurality's decision, in Turner I, to remand for further examination to
determine whether Congress's factual conclusions were adequately supported by the legislative
record. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512 U.S. 622, 664-68 (1994) (plurality
opinion); Bryant & Simeone, supra note 10, at 332-39.
36. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,463-64 (1981) (quoting Vance
v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979) and citing Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S.
421, 425 (1952) and Henderson Co. v. Thompson, 300 U.S. 258, 264-65 (1937)).
37. Id. at 464.
38. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co.,
393 U.S. 129, 138-39 (1968); see also Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 333 (1993) (holding that,
on rational basis review, courts must defer to state legislature's factual judgments, even if
erroneous, when the legislature's factual judgments may plausibly be correct); Rast v. Van
Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 357 (1916) (similar).
39. See Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163, 1174 (9th Cir.
2006), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart 11), 127 S. Ct. 1610
(2007).
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facts as a decisive factor in determining the constitutionality of legislation, while at
other times it treats facts as largely irrelevant to that inquiry.40 This inconsistency
pervades the Court's application of constitutional tests that expressly turn on questions
of fact. Moreover, the Court has never made clear whether "deference" to legislative
fact-finding allows (or requires) courts to go beyond the legislative record to
corroborate or supplement the facts.
Another source of uncertainty is that courts and commentators often use the term
"deference" broadly, to encompass deference not only to Congress's fact-finding but
also to its policy choices.4 1 Although the line between legislatures' empirical fact-
finding and policy judgments is not always crisply drawn, it is important to consider
each of these legislative functions distinctly. In enacting a piece of legislation, a
legislative body, generally through a committee, collects factual evidence relevant to
the proposal. It then makes a policy judgment as to whether action is warranted in light
of the facts.
If, for example, a legislature finds that the rate of death by head injury among
motorcyclists has increased since it repealed a law requiring helmets, it may decide to
reinstate the requirement. Deciding whether or not to require helmets is a policy
judgment. As with all policy judgments, the legislature must make a choice, and that
choice will turn at least in part on a factual assessment. But the underlying
determination that the rate of head injuries has increased, and that the increase can
validly be attributed to the repeal, is an instance of empirical fact-finding. Experts may
40. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 638 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(criticizing majority opinion for suggesting that the "substantial effects" analysis under the
Commerce Clause "is not a factual enquiry, for Congress in the first instance with subsequent
judicial review looking only to the rationality of the congressional conclusion, but one of a
rather different sort, dependent upon a uniquely judicial competence"); see also Devins, supra
note 22, at 1172-73. Devins claims that when the Court treats facts as decisive, it usually does
so in cases in which it agrees with the legislative outcome, and thus it tends to defer to the
legislature's fact-finding. When the Court disagrees with the legislative outcome, it tends to cast
the question as one of law rather than of fact, and to sidestep the question of deference to fact-
finding by treating the facts as immaterial to the Court's inquiry. See id. at 1173-75 (discussing
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000), and City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)); Kramer, supra note 10, at 149-51
(arguing that the Court engages in close scrutiny of legislative record when it wants to "maintain
interpretive control").
41. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 196 (1997)
("Deference must be accorded to [Congress's] findings as to the harm to be avoided and to the
remedial measures adopted for that end." (emphasis added)); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,
206 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (objecting that "[w]hen my Brothers refer to 'complex factual
questions'. . . they call to mind disputes about primary, objective facts dealing with such issues
as the number of persons between the ages of 18 and 21, the extent of their education, and so
forth," when in fact the real disagreement "revolves around the evaluation of this largely
uncontested factual material"); Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional
Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L. REv. 199, 210-11 (1971) (discussing "deference to legislative
determinations of fact" but raising concern over courts' questioning of legislatures' policy
judgments); Kramer, supra note 10, at 151-52 (stating that judicial deference to Congress has
historically encompassed both deference to Congress's "choice of means to implement the
Constitution's grants of power" and to its "factual conclusions").
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dispute the factual question, but the question does not present legislators or courts with
the same kind of choice inherent in questions of policy or legal interpretation. In short,
a legislature's empirical fact-finding identifies a problem, and its policy choices offer a
solution.
Empirical fact-finding is a distinct step in the process of enactment for virtually all
legislation, and it is in this sense that I refer to "legislative fact-finding" in this
Article.42 Often, fact-finding is an implicit step, and sometimes a legislature will not
engage in formal fact-finding at all but will instead act upon a shared understanding of
the social facts necessitating the legislation. On occasion a legislature will spell out its
factual conclusions in a so-labeled section of the legislation. 43 While fact-finding at
some level always occurs, a legislature's explicit inclusion of factual findings helps the
court identify the specific facts upon which the legislature relied. 44 Whether to defer to
a legislature's policy choices raises very different questions about legitimacy and
competency than whether to defer to a legislature's empirical fact-finding.45 In this
Article, I address only the latter topic.
Further confusion in courts' and commentators' treatment ofjudicial deference to
legislative fact-finding stems from the murky lines that separate factual findings from
moral judgments or legal conclusions. If legislatures think that courts will defer to their
factual findings, they are likely to present what are really moral positions or legal
conclusions as factual findings.46 For example, a legislature wanting to justify its
enactment of state-sponsored sterilization of mentally retarded persons might find that
"the welfare of society may be promoted in certain cases by the sterilization of mental
defectives," a morally laden conclusion that is not susceptible of empirical, evidentiary
proof.47 Or a legislature may find that a particular abortion restriction does not unduly
burden women, a "factual" conclusion that decides the legal question whether the law
42. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("By passing legislation,
Congress indicates its conclusion, whether explicitly or not, that facts support its exercise of the
commerce power."); see also Kenneth Culp Davis, supra note 8, at 402 (stating that creation of
law depends upon fact-finding).
43. See, e.g., Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. § 7101 (2006) (including
findings on trafficking in the sex industry); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6901 (2000) (including findings on solid waste disposal); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17A-1.2 (West
2002) (including findings concerning minors' ability to make informed medical decisions and
concerning the "medical, emotional, and psychological consequences of abortion").
44. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Any explicit findings that Congress
chooses to make, though not dispositive of the question of rationality, may advance judicial
review by identifying factual authority on which Congress relied.").
45. See Pilchen, supra note 22, at 397.
46. See, e.g., Caitlin E. Borgmann, The Packaging of Ideology as Science in Legislative
Factfinding on Abortion, 16 J.L. & POL'Y (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript on file with the
Indiana Law Journal).
47. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205, 207 (1927) (deferring in part to "the general
declarations of the legislature" regarding mentally retarded people); see Suzanne B. Goldberg,
Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social Change, and Fact-BasedAdjudication, 106
CoLuM. L. REv. 1955, 1965 (2006) (using Buck v. Bell to demonstrate the normative judgments
underlying many "factual" assertions by courts). Goldberg distinguishes between "thin"
(objective or empirical) facts and "thick" facts (which contain moral judgments) and argues that
courts routinely obscure the distinction between "thick" and "thin" facts. Id. at 1965-74.
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unconstitutionally poses an undue burden.48 Courts too can cause mischief by requiring
unreasonable measures of scientific proof and accuracy to support measures resting in
significant part on moral or other nonempirical norms.49
It is important to isolate factual findings that are free of moral content from moral
judgments that masquerade as objective fact.50 Whether legislatures or courts are more
competent at finding empirical facts is a wholly separate question from when and
whether unprovable moral assertions justify particular legislative responses orjudicial
rulings and which institution we should entrust with such decisions.
Yet another common confusion in discussions about judicial deference to legislative
fact-finding lies in the nature of the connection between constitutional tiers of review
and judicial deference to legislative fact-finding. Courts and commentators have often
asserted or implied that the constitutional tiers of review dictate the extent to which
courts should defer to legislative fact-finding.51 It is frequently claimed, for example,
that strict scrutiny mandates a skeptical evaluation of legislative fact-finding, while
rational basis review implies a deferential approach.52
The constitutional tiers of review, however, are neither a reliable predictor of
judicial deference to legislative fact-finding nor an acceptable guide to the
appropriateness of such deference. 53 First, courts have not consistently given deference
even when applying rational basis review. 54 Second, courts sometimes have given
deference where strict or heightened scrutiny does apply.55 Third, in cases involving
48. See Faigman et al., supra note 11, at 70.
49. See, e.g., Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382,408 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Mikva, J., dissenting)
("Rather than supporting my colleagues' view that gender classifications must be supported by
statistical evidence, Craig v. Boren warns of the dangers of their approach: ... proving broad
sociological propositions by statistics is a dubious business, and one that inevitably is in tension
with the normative philosophy that underlies the Equal Protection Clause."); cf FAiGMAN, supra
note 24, at 27, 162 (noting that "[tihe probabilistic character of applied science is an inherent
limitation of the discipline" and asserting that "[t]he empirical uncertainties of factual
statements are as important as the statements themselves and should be part of the legal
calculus").
50. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.205 (West 2000) (including "findings" that "the life of
each human being begins at conception," that "[u]nborn children have protectable interests in
life, health, and well-being"; and that "[t]he natural parents of unborn children have protectable
interests in the life, health, and well-being of their unborn child").
51. See, e.g., Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 844 (S.D. Ind. 2006)
(suggesting that court's refusal to apply strict scrutiny to state voter identification law meant that
court could not question state's factual justifications for the law (citing FCC v. Beach
Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993))), affd sub nom. Crawford v. Marion County
Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007), aff'd, 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008); Am. Subcontractors
Ass'n, Ga. Chapter, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 376 S.E.2d 662, 664-65 (Ga. 1989).
52. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 333 (1993) (stating that under rational basis review,
courts must defer to factual assumptions underlying legislative rationale, even if they are
erroneous); Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 844; Faigman et al., supra note 11, at 87.
53. See FAIOMAN, supra note 24, at 130 ("[T]he answer to the question of how much
deference is owed cannot be premised simply on preexisting standards ofjudicial review....").
54. See, e.g., infra notes 82-89 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhartl), 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1635-38 (2007) (deferring
implicitly to Congress's finding that intact D&E abortion procedure is not significantly safer
than other procedures while applying undue burden standard); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC
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legislation alleged to infringe basic personal rights, there has been a proliferation of
standards governing the constitutionality of such legislation. 56 Recently, the Supreme
Court has seemed reluctant to acknowledge explicitly what standard it is applying.57
Uncertainty about which test the Court is applying in a given case and about the
significance of the various tests makes it difficult to state as a general proposition
whether deference to legislative fact-finding is inherent in a particular standard of
review.
Moreover, the level of constitutional review a court should apply is (or should be) a
distinct question from whether it should defer to a legislature's fact-fmding. 8 The
former is a question about how deferential of a legal standard a court should apply to
the facts. The standard of review thus provides the legal framework within which facts
are evaluated.59 If a court applies a deferential legal standard of review in evaluating
whether a constitutional violation has occurred, it need not necessarily accept the truth
of facts found by the legislature. In contrast, in applying a stringent standard of review,
a court could nevertheless defer to the legislature's findings of empirical fact.
A deferential legal standard of review may mean that the court accepts the law's
stated purpose as the actual purpose. For example, the court might defer to a state
legislature's assertion that its involuntary commitment procedures for mentally retarded
persons are intended to protect society from those who pose a danger and to protect
mentally retarded individuals from themselves.60 Or a court may defer to a legislature's
judgment about the wisdom of or need for particular legislation given a certain set of
(Turner I1), 520 U.S. 180, 189, 195-96 (1997) (deferring to Congress's fact-finding while
applying intermediate scrutiny in First Amendment challenge); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S.
191,208-09 (1992) (applying strict scrutiny to a state restriction on speech at polling places but
declining to require empirical evidence to support the law). But see Turner II, 520 U.S. at 229
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that Court "misapplies the 'intermediate scrutiny'
framework it adopts" and that, "[a]lthough we owe deference to Congress' predictivejudgments
and its evaluation of complex economic questions, we have an independent duty... to inquire
into the reasonableness of congressional findings regarding [the statutory scheme's] necessity").
56. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 950,952 (7th Cir. 2007)
(deciding whether Indiana voting requirement imposed an "undue burden on the right to vote"
and asserting that "[a] strict standard would be especially inappropriate"), af'd, 128 S. Ct. 1610
(2008); Crawford, 472 F.3d at 956 (Evans, J., dissenting) (arguing that court should apply a
standard "that would at least be something close to 'strict scrutiny light"'). See generally Jeffrey
M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels ofScrutiny, 45 OHIfo
ST. L.J. 161 (1984).
57. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575-78 (2003).
58. Cf Solove, supra note 20, at 955 ("In deference cases, the very minimal examination of
factual and empirical evidence tends to override whatever level of scrutiny is applied, and is
often dispositive."); Harper Jean Tobin, Confronting Misinformation on Abortion: Informed
Consent, Deference, and Fetal Pain Laws, 17 COLuM. J. GENDER & L. 111, 129-30 (2008)
(describing how deference to legislative fact-finding can be determinative in free speech cases
even where legal standard remains the same).
59. See Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791, 797 (8th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing factual
question of whether an abortion procedure "is medically necessary in a given instance" from
legal question of whether there is sufficient evidence to meet legal standard of "substantial
medical authority"), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007); see also FAIGMAN, supra note 24, at 49
("Ultimately,... even the plainest facts.., must be evaluated in light of the applicable legal
standard.").
60. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 339 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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facts by requiring only a rational connection between the two (in this example, the
factual premises may not be in doubt, but the connection to the stated legislative goal
may be attenuated). In either case, however, the court could still require the
government to submit factual evidence supporting the law's rationality. 61
Courts and commentators often conflate strict scrutiny (and the burden of proof
traditionally placed upon the government under that standard) with judicial skepticism
of legislative fact-finding, but again the two are distinct, though related, doctrines. In
contrast with rational basis review, a court applying strict scrutiny views the
legislature's goals skeptically and may reject certain goals as insufficiently compelling
to justify the adopted measure. Or it may accept the goal as compelling but may find
that, in light of the empirical facts, the "fit" between the legislation and the stated goal
is too loose.62
There is nothing inherent in the strict or heightened scrutiny standards that
precludes the government from relying on a legislature's factual findings in lieu of
submitting evidence in court or the court from relying on such findings regardless of
whether the government has submitted evidence. A court theoretically could defer to
the legislature's fact-finding while applying a stringent legal standard of review. A
court granting such deference would still have to determine whether Congress's goal in
enacting the legislation was a compelling (or "important") one.63 It would also examine
skeptically the fit between the law's provisions and this goal in light of the facts found
by the legislature. 64
This may appear to shift the burden of proof in strict scrutiny cases from the
government to the plaintiff/challenger (contrary to what is normally required), but it is
in fact different. The burden of proof would remain with the government, which must
put forward a compelling interest and prove that its law is not over-inclusive. 65
61. See infra text accompanying note 78 (discussing factual assumptions underlying
Kentucky civil commitment law).
62. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989).
63. In Carhart II, the Court deferred to the legislature on the key disputed medical facts,
and then determined whether the legislation imposed an undue burden on abortion. See, e.g.,
infra text accompanying note 315.
64. A hypothetical law imposing a curfew only on African American youth illustrates how a
court might apply a strict legal test while deferring to the legislature on the facts. Assume a
legislature finds, based on credible evidence, that minors who stay out late at night are more
likely to be harmed than those who stay home. Assume it also finds, based on wholly non-
credible evidence, that African American youth are exceedingly likely to be harmed when
staying out late, whereas the risks to white youth are negligible. A court granting deference
would not question either premise but would presume both findings were true and would
proceed to determine whether the law met a compelling state interest and, assuming it did,
whether the law was narrowly tailored to meet this interest. The burden would then shift to the
challenger to prove that the evidence in the legislative record was flawed.
65. This distinction is akin to that between a presumption and the burden of proof under the
Federal Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. EviD. 301 ("[A] presumption imposes on the party
against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the
presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of
nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally
cast." (emphasis added)); H.R. REP. No. 93-1597, at 5 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098, 7099 (same); Tobin, supra note 58, at 129-30 (distinguishing deference to
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Of course, a court's deference to the legislative fact-finding would give the
government an enormous leg up. One might well respond that for a court to grant
deference to a legislature's fact-finding would therefore seem to undermine the very
purpose of strict scrutiny. It makes intuitive sense that a court applying the strict
scrutiny standard should examine the legislature's factual premises closely by requiring
them to be proved in court. But this is only a justifiable intuition if we have reason to
doubt the integrity of the legislature's fact-finding. We may doubt the neutrality or
reliability of the legislature's fact-finding in these circumstances. Or perhaps we do not
ever particularly trust the integrity of legislative fact-finding but are particularly wary
of deferring to it when the potential resulting harms are great.
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that judicial deference to legislative fact-
finding does not logically follow simply because the court is applying a strict legal
standard. Conversely, if we have reason to suspect the integrity of legislative fact-
finding where strict scrutiny applies, then there may be other circumstances, including
cases in which rational basis review applies, in which we think a court should not grant
deference.66
B. The Courts'Inconsistent Treatment of Legislative Fact-Finding
Despite the confusion about what is meant by "judicial deference to legislative fact-
finding," there is a distinct thread in the case law that counsels the importance of
judicial deference to the legislature's collection and evaluation of empirical evidence to
support a piece of legislation.67 Thus, for example, in Rostker v. Goldberg, the Court
referred distinctly to the importance of judicial deference both to Congress's policy
judgments in matters of military affairs as well as to its empirical fact-finding: "In
deciding the question before us we must be particularly careful not to substitute our
judgment of what is desirable for that of Congress, or our own evaluation of evidence
for a reasonable evaluation by the Legislative Branch."68
Deference to a legislature's fact-finding can occur regardless of whether it has
formally found facts. If the legislature has not included formal findings in the statute
itself, the court may presume that such facts exist, and the burden will be on the
challenger to prove in court that they do not.69 The legislature may have held hearings
but declined to include any factual findings in the legislation, or it may not have held
any hearings at all. In either case, a court could still give deference to the legislature on
the relevant facts by presuming that facts supporting the need for the legislation exist,
whether or not such facts were actually established in the legislative process. The 1876
decision Munn v. Illinois70 was an early case in which the Supreme Court granted such
fact-finding from burden of proof).
66. See infra Part III.B; infra notes 267-69 and accompanying text.
67. See generally Solove, supra note 20 (reviewing history ofjudicial deference).
68. 453 U.S. 57, 68 (1981) (emphasis added); see id. at 72-74 (noting extensive evidence
amassed by Congress on the issue of registering women for the draft).
69. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (stating that the Court will assume factual
basis exists for challenged legislation and, to prevail, plaintiff must "negative every conceivable
basis which might support it"); Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 357 (1916)
("[T]he existence of that state of facts [that would sustain a law] at the time the law was enacted
must be assumed.").
70. 94U.S. 113(1876).
20091
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
a presumption to a state legislature. Archibald Cox attributes to that case the first"suggestion that ascertainment and characterization of facts, even when constitutionally
decisive, may be a job for the legislature rather than the judiciary."'"
In Munn, the Court examined a state law limiting prices charged by grain elevators.
The plaintiffs argued that the state regulation of prices amounted to a taking of
property without just compensation. The case turned in part on a question of fact-the
extent to which private grain warehouses were devoted to public use.72 In deferring to
the legislature on that question, the Court stated, "For our purposes we must assume
that, if a state of facts could exist that would justify such legislation, it actually did
exist when the statute ... was passed. 73 Cox claims that the Court "allocated the
responsibility for deciding that question to the legislature, even though the
constitutionality of the statute depended on the response."74 However, the Court did not
examine actual fact-finding conducted by the legislature but rather simply presumed
the existence of the relevant facts.
The rational basis standard has been interpreted to allow deference to
constitutionally determinative facts even in the absence of express legislative fact-
finding.75 Courts have often repeated that under this standard of review, the legislature
is under no obligation to put forward any evidence to support its policy choice. 76 The
burden of proof is then on the plaintiff to "negative every conceivable basis which
might support it."' 77 For example, in Heller v. Doe, the Supreme Court simply assumed
the existence of underlying facts that would support Kentucky's differential burden of
proof requirements in involuntary commitment proceedings for people who are
mentally retarded, as compared with those who are mentally ill. Thus, the Court found
that "it would have been plausible for Kentucky to conclude that the dangerousness
determination was more accurate as to the mentally retarded than the mentally ill" and
that "most mentally retarded individuals who are committed receive treatment that is
different from, and less invasive than, that to which the mentally ill are subjected.7 8
Courts may also give deference to a legislature's actual fact-finding. In such cases, a
legislature does amass a factual record and reaches factual conclusions based upon that
record, and a court defers to them. For example, in Turner II, the Court detailed the
evidence before Congress and noted that "there was specific support for its conclusion
that cable operators had considerable and growing market power over local video
71. Cox, supra note 41, at 207.
72. Munn, 94 U.S. at 130-32.
73. Id. at 132.
74. Cox, supra note 41, at 207.
75. But see infra text accompanying notes 82-85.
76. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) ("A State... has no obligation to
produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification. '[A] legislative choice is
not subject to courtroom factflnding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by
evidence or empirical data."' (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993))).
77. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356,364 (1973) (internal quotation
omitted); Beach Commc'ns, 508 U.S. at 315.
78. Heller, 509 U.S. at 324-26.
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programming markets., 79 However, even in these contexts, courts have typically gone
beyond the legislative record, creating an expanded body of facts at the judicial level.80
At times the Court has deferred to express legislative fact-finding, but its deference
has been implicit. In Carhart II, the Court purported not to defer to Congress's fact-
finding, but its upholding of the federal abortion procedure ban was possible only
because the Court in fact did implicitly defer to Congress on the key medical facts in
dispute. 1
The principle of deference to legislative fact-finding has been applied
inconsistently. At times, the Court has suggested that judicial deference to legislative
fact-finding is not warranted when specially protected rights are at stake.82 But
recently, the Court has declined to give deference even in the absence of specially
protected rights. For example, in contrast to the Dormant Commerce Clause context,
where the Supreme Court has often been deferential to state legislative fact-finding,8 3
the Court has recently been notably loath to defer to Congress's fact-finding in cases
challenging Congress's power to act under the Commerce Clause84 or the Fourteenth
Amendment's Enforcement Clause.8 5
Likewise, the courts have sometimes looked skeptically at fact-finding supporting
legislation purportedly entitled to deferential review, such as sex-based classifications,
86and have required independent evidence to justify these classifications. In Lamprecht
v. FCC, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated, "although we
are 'to give great weight to the decisions of Congress and to the experience of the
Commission,' we are still obliged in the end to review the government's policy-both
79. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1!), 520 U.S. 180, 196-99 (1997).
80. See id. at 208-13; infra note 89 (discussing Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547
(1990)).
81. See infra text accompanying notes 176, 297.
82. See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 248 (2006) (noting that despite state
legislature's expertise regarding "the costs and nature of running for office," courts must
conduct an independent review of the factual record to determine whether campaign
contribution limits violate First Amendment); Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc., v. FCC, 492 U.S.
115, 129 (1989) ("Deference to a legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry when First
Amendment rights are at stake." (citing Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829,
843 (1978))).
83. See, e.g., Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac.
R.R. Co., 393 U.S. 129, 133-34, 138-39 (1968).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); see also Buzbee & Schapiro,
supra note 10, at 89; Colker & Brudney, supra note 10, at 97-101; Kramer, supra note 10, at
142.
85. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); City ofBoeme v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997); Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 10, at 89; Colker & Brudney, supra note 10, at 93-
101; Post & Siegel, supra note 10, at 11-12.
86. See, e.g., Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382, 393 & n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("Any'predictive judgments' concerning group behavior and the differences in behavior among
different groups must at the very least be sustained by meaningful evidence." (citing Metro
Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975)); cf City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 450 (1985) (invalidating city's denial of special use permit for group home for mentally
retarded due to lack of evidence to justify city's action).
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the judgment of law that the policy is constitutional and the findings of fact that
underlie it."87 The court described the required review as deferential and not de novo,
but it insisted that the meaningfulness of judicial review depended on the courts'
entitlement to "review a legislature's judgment that the facts exist."88 It then reviewed
the legislative judgment that women who own radio or television stations are more
likely than white men to broadcast distinct types of programming and found there was
insufficient evidence to support this judgment.8 9
Before we can determine whether and in what circumstances a court should defer to
legislative fact-finding, we must examine the historical reasons for such deference.
Case law and commentators have suggested that the reasons for giving deference to
legislative fact-finding include both concerns about the respective roles and powers of
the legislatures and the judiciary-which body holds the authority to engage in fact-
finding-as well as a more practical concern about which institution does a better job
of fact-finding. 90 These considerations are often framed in terms of legitimacy, on the
one hand, and competence (or capacity) on the other.9
1
C. Institutional Legitimacy as Grounds for Judicial Deference to Legislative Fact-
Finding
Some court opinions suggest that our constitutional structure provides the stronger
of the two rationales for deferring to legislative fact-finding. For example, in Oregon v.
Mitchell, the Court held unconstitutional, as applied to state elections, Congress's
attempt to lower the minimum voting age to eighteen years. 92 In his concurring
opinion, Justice Harlan stated that judgments "of the sort involved here are beyond the
institutional competence and constitutional authority of the judiciary."93 He asserted
that "[j]udicial deference is based, not on relativefactfinding competence, but on due
regard for the decision of the body constitutionally appointed to decide." 94
Even in Turner II, where the Court emphasized Congress's superiority in fact-
finding, the Court was also careful to note the separation of powers concerns
supporting the principle of deference it applied. Thus, the Court asserted,
We owe Congress' findings an additional measure of deference out of respect for
its authority to exercise the legislative power. Even in the realm of First
87. Lamprecht, 958 F.2d at 391 (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 392 n.2.
89. See id. at 392-98. Similarly, in Metro Broadcasting, the Supreme Court purported to"give great weight" to Congress's determination that minority-owned broadcast outlets would
lead to greater broadcasting diversity. 497 U.S. at 579. Nevertheless, in concluding that this
determination was supported by a "host of empirical evidence," the Court seemed to find it
necessary to go beyond the legislative record in order to corroborate Congress's conclusion. Id.
at 580.
90. Yet a third reason may be that the Court's rationales for granting or denying deference
are merely a pretext allowing the Court to reach the substantive result it wants. See Solove,
supra note 20, at 945.
91. See, e.g., HOROWITZ, supra note 8, at 18-19.
92. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118 (1970).
93. Id at 206-07 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 207 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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Amendment questions where Congress must base its conclusions upon substantial
evidence, deference must be accorded to its findings as to the harm to be avoided
and to the remedial measures adopted for that end, lest we infringe on traditional
legislative authority to make predictive judgments when enacting nationwide
regulatory policy.95
Likewise, in Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v. Chicago, Rock
Island & Pacific R.R. Co., the Court deferred to the Arkansas legislature's decision to
increase safety by requiring full train crews, asserting that this was not a decision
appropriately left to the courts. 96 The Court reprimanded the district court for
substituting its judgment for the legislature's concerning how much safety was
required.97 Because of the Court's strong view that the policy judgment was for the
legislature to make, the Court found that where evidence was debatable or
inconclusive, deference should be given to the legislature's factual assumptions.
98
Some commentators have asserted that, when the Court decides whether to defer to
a legislature's fact-finding based on the supposed sufficiency or insufficiency of the
legislative record, the Court is in fact more concerned with which institution is the
most appropriate ultimate decision maker.99 This assertion is supported by the Court's
opinion in City ofBoerne v. Flores.'° There, Congress's fact-finding bore on the issue
of whether Congress had the power to act pursuant to the Enforcement Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court looked to whether the congressional record
demonstrated a need for Congress to intervene to prevent states from enacting
generally applicable laws that burdened religious practices.' 0' The Court found the
factual showing lacking, but it expressed even greater concern about what it perceived
as Congress's improper meddling in determining the scope of constitutional rights:
Th[e] lack of support in the legislative record ... is not RFRA's [Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993] most serious shortcoming. Judicial deference,
in most cases, is based not on the state of the legislative record Congress compiles
but "on due regard for the decision of the body constitutionally appointed to
decide." . . .Regardless of the state of the legislative record, RFRA cannot be
considered remedial, preventive legislation, if those terms are to have any
95. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 11), 520 U.S. 180, 196 (1997).
96. 393 U.S. 129, 136-38 (1968).
97. See id. at 136.
98. See id. at 138-39 ("The District Court's responsibility for making 'findings of fact'
certainly does not authorize it to resolve conflicts in the evidence against the legislature's
conclusion or even to reject the legislative judgment on the basis that without convincing
statistics in the record to support it, the legislative viewpoint constitutes nothing more than what
the District Court in this case said was 'pure speculation."').
99. See Kramer, supra note 10, at 142 (asserting that in United States v. Morrison, the
Court "did not actually care how good a factual record Congress had compiled" but was instead
concerned with solidifying its own power); Pilchen, supra note 22, at 338. But see Devins,
supra note 22, at 1177 (arguing that the Court may depict issues as questions of law, rather than
fact, when it is skeptical of Congress's fact-finding but does not want to lose public acceptance
by appearing to usurp Congress's fact-finding function).
100. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
101. Seeid. at514.
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meaning.... It appears, instead, to attempt a substantive change in constitutionalprotections.' 02
The Court has indicated that comity and institutional legitimacy may demand greater
deference to legislative fact-finding in particular contexts. For example, the Court has
held that when Congress exercises its constitutional authority over national defense and
military affairs, the call for judicial deference is "at its apogee."',0 3
D. Superior Legislative Competence as Grounds for Judicial Deference to
Legislative Fact-Finding
Elsewhere, courts have suggested that judicial deference to legislative fact-finding is
warranted because legislatures excel in their capacity for fact-finding, as compared
with the courts. The traditionalist view of social fact-finding, as Neal Devins has
concisely summarized it, holds that "Congress can do it; courts cannot." 0 4 In judicial
opinions, the claim is generally stated in conclusory fashion, without illuminating why
this should be so. For example, in Turner II, the Supreme Court declared, "We owe
Congress' findings deference in part because the institution is far better equipped than
the judiciary to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing upon legislative
questions."' 0 5 Justice Souter made a similar assertion in United States v. Morrison,
where he argued in dissent that the Court should defer to Congress's fact-finding:
Congress has the power to legislate with regard to activity that, in the aggregate,
has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The fact of such a substantial
effect is not an issue for the courts in the first instance, but for the Congress,
whose institutional capacity for gathering evidence and taking testimony far
exceeds ours. By passing legislation, Congress indicates its conclusion, whether
explicitly or not, that facts support its exercise of the commerce power. The
business of the courts is to review the congressional assessment, not for soundness
but simply for the rationality of concluding that a jurisdictional basis exists in
fact.' °0
The Court's self-confessed inferiority in social fact-finding is not limited to federal
legislation. The Court has also described state legislatures as superior fact-finders due
to their greater flexibility and their sensitivity to local conditions. For example, in
102. Id. at 531-32 (emphasis added).
103. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 65, 70-71 (1981). In addition to separation of
powers concerns, the Court in Rostker also noted that the courts' "lack of competence" in
military matters is "marked." Id. at 65.
104. Devins, supra note 22, at 1178. But see FAIGMAN, supra note 24, at 114-15 (arguing
that "the factor of institutional competence is not very important for a comprehensive theory of
constitutional facts").
105. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997); see also
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 550 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Walters v. Nat'l
Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 330 n.12 (1985); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93,
111 (1979).
106. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 628 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
[Vol. 84:1
RETHINKING JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
McKleskey v. Kemp, the Court found that state "[ljegislatures... are better qualified to
weigh and 'evaluate the results of statistical studies in terms of their own local
conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is not available to the courts.' 10 7 In
Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., the Court, in deciding the constitutionality of a
Florida statute, declared that the factual underpinnings of state legislation, even where"opposed by argument and opinion of serious strength," were "not within the
competency of the courts to arbitrate."' 0' Similarly, in Carhart I, Justice Kennedy
argued in dissent that the courts lack the capacity to assess factual questions concerning
abortion procedures, noting that "[tihe legislatures of the several States have superior
factfinding capabilities in this regard."'1 9
The courts have sometimes tied Congress's allegedly superior competence to certain
fact-finding contexts. For example, Congress is purportedly better suited than the
courts to gather and analyze "predictive facts" in the course of national regulatory
policy making and possesses special competence to resolve factual questions with
economic and technological implications." 0 The Court has deferred to Congress's
supposed expertise in military matters."' In Randall v. Sorrell, the Court noted that
"legislators have 'particular expertise' in matters related to the costs and nature of
running for office." ' 1 2 Similar context-specific claims are made about state legislative
capacity for fact-finding. For instance, state legislatures allegedly possess particular
fact-finding competence in the economic arena" 3 and in evaluating medical
procedures. 114
107. 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976)); see
also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 707, 788 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (asserting
that legislatures "have more flexible mechanisms for factfinding than the Judiciary," and have
"the power to experiment, moving forward and pulling back as facts emerge within their own
jurisdictions").
108. 240 U.S. 342, 357 (1916).
109. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 968 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also City of
Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 456 n.4 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (noting that state legislatures, "with their superior fact-finding capabilities, are
certainly better able to make the necessary judgments [about abortion procedures] than are the
courts").
110. Turner II, 520 U.S. at 199 ("[C]ourts must accord substantial deference to the
predictive judgments of Congress.... This principle has special significance in cases, like this
one, involving congressional judgments concerning regulatory schemes of inherent complexity
and assessments about the likely interaction of industries undergoing rapid economic and
technological change." (citations omitted)). Nevertheless, in its recent Commerce Clause
decisions, the Court has refused to defer to Congress's predictive judgments concerning the
need for legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment or the impact of various regulations on
interstate commerce. See Bryant & Simeone, supra note 10; Colker & Brudney, supra note 10;
Post & Siegel, supra note 10.
111. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503,507 (1986); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S.
57, 66 (1981).
112. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 248 (2006) (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 137 (2003)) (declining, nevertheless, to defer to Vermont's factual
assumptions underlying its campaign contribution limits).
113. See, e.g., Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226, 237 (1986) (Utter, J., dissenting).
114. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart1), 530 U.S. 914, 968-71 (2000) (Kennedy, J.,
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In contrast, the courts are often portrayed as relatively poor fact-finders, especially
with respect to complex factual issues. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Oregon v.
Mitchell, stated, "The nature of the judicial process makes it an inappropriate forum for
the determination of complex factual questions of the kind so often involved in
constitutional adjudication."' 115
Commentators have focused more extensively on relative institutional competence
and the rationales underlying the belief that legislatures are superior fact-finders. Some
of the arguments for superior legislative competence are specific to Congress, but
many apply to state legislatures as well."l6 Because legislatures are less insulated from
the public, some commentators suggest that they may have a more immediate
connection to and awareness of the social circumstances that call for legislative
solutions. 17 Legislators' diversity of backgrounds and experience is seen as giving
legislative bodies a broader understanding of the social and economic conditions
relevant to legislation." 8
It is often pointed out that, particularly in Congress, committee members tend to
specialize, whereas judges are generalists." 9 Therefore, it is claimed, legislators
possess valuable expertise that makes them better fact-finders, at least in certain
contexts. 20 Also, because litigation is tied to a specific issue and to particular litigants
who are directly affected by that issue, some point out that courts' decisions will have a
narrow factual focus, whereas legislatures are more likely to consider the broad swath
of social facts relevant to a particular law. More formally, courts are bound by "case or
controversy" requirements, stare decisis, and other doctrines that limit their inquiry in
ways not applicable to legislatures.
As fact-finders, commentators have noted, courts are also generally at the mercy of
whatever facts are put before them by the litigants.'12 If the litigants lack the resources
dissenting); City ofAkron, 462 U.S. at 456 & n.4 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
115. 400 U.S. 112, 247-48 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
116. The Florida Senate's Web site contains a section describing the committee process,
which is representative of that employed by many states. It observes, "The committee is the
heart of the legislative process. Committees can and should do the fact-finding groundwork."
Florida Senate, The Committee Process, http://www.flsenate.gov/cgi-
bin/ViewPage.pl?Tab=infocenter&Submenu=1 &File=process.html&Directory=InfoCent
er/about-legislature/&Location=app&Title=-%3EHowTheCommitteeProcessWorks. It
goes on to note that the committee may consult the opinion of "interested persons" outside of
the legislature; subpoena witnesses or records; use the legislature's research facilities to"analyze the situation here and in other states"; and hear the testimony of citizens. Id.
117. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONsTrUON AWAY FROM THE COURTS 68 (1999);
Devins, supra note 22, at 1179. But see DAviD R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL
CONNECTION 79 (1974) (quoting former Congressman Clem Miller on serving in the House:
"[w]e live in a cocoon of good feeling").
118. See Devins, supra note 22, at 1179.
119. See HoRowrrz, supra note 8, at 28-29; Pilchen, supra note 22, at 365.
120. See HoRowrrz, supra note 8, at 28-29; Solove, supra note 20, at 1005-06.
121. Strictly speaking, this constraint applies only to adjudicative facts. As to social facts
(the kinds of facts legislatures also consider), judges may independently consult and rely on
sources outside the record developed by the litigants, see Kenneth Culp Davis, supra note 8, at
402-07; Ronald M. Levin, The Administrative Law Legacy of Kenneth Culp Davis, 42 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 315, 321-22 (2005), but they may not always take advantage of this opportunity.
See Devins, supra note 22, at 1181; see also Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 10, at 92 ("Judges
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or incentives to present all of the relevant evidence, some fear, the courts' fact-finding
will suffer. And, although the parties may employ specialists to help develop the
factual record, these experts cannot "speak for themselves" in court; instead, the
information is filtered through the medium of the litigator and the rules of evidence.
122
Congress, on the other hand, is renowned for its broad subpoena power, which many
assume Congress will use to examine topics more sweepingly.123 Beyond this, it is
noted, Congress has access to a broad range of informal sources of information that
assist it in understanding the relevant factual context. 124
II. CASE STUDIES
Notwithstanding the theoretical arguments supporting deference to legislative fact-
finding, this Article argues that legislatures are poor fact-finders, especially when
compared to federal trial courts, and when addressing legislation that infringes
controversial or minority rights. This Part offers three case studies that cast doubt upon
the theory that legislatures are superior fact-finders. Part III, then, revisits and critiques
the structural arguments in favor ofjudicial deference laid out in Part I.
The shortcomings of the legislative fact-finding process, whether at the federal or
state level, tend to be revealed quickly when one examines the legislative record
underlying nearly any proposal that implicates basic individual rights and arises in a
contentious or controversial setting. The following case studies offer striking examples
of poor fact-finding by legislatures in such contexts. In some instances, the legislatures
did not engage in any fact-finding at all, assuming wholly without inquiry the facts
allegedly calling for regulation, despite the controversial nature of the subjects they
were addressing. The case studies also demonstrate the decisive role played by the
courts' willingness or refusal to defer to the legislature on the key factual issues in each
case.
A. "Partial-Birth Abortion"
Abortion is a topic that arouses high passions in legislative debates, and the "partial-
birth abortion" debate, which preoccupied nearly every state legislature as well as
Congress in the 1990s, was especially fraught. The campaign to ban so-called "partial-
birth abortion" began as a collaboration between a National Right to Life Committee
(NRLC) lobbyist, Douglas Johnson, and Charles Canady, a Republican congressman
from Florida.125 The anti-abortion-rights movement had failed to see Roe v. Wade
overturned in the 1980s and early 1990s. In response to its decisive defeat in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,126 the movement shifted its focus
may draw on their knowledge and experience and other matters not formally presented.
However, judges operate under an institutional constraint that formally confines their decision
making to materials compiled in the record.").
122. HoRowrrz, supra note 8, at 25-26; see id. at 47-49.
123. See Devins, supra note 22, at 1178-79.
124. See HoRowrrz, supra note 8, at 30; Devins, supra note 22, at 1179.
125. See Cynthia Gomey, Gambling with Abortion: Why Both Sides Think They Have
Everything To Lose, HARPER'S MAG., Nov. 2004, at 33, 38; Nadine Strossen & Caitlin
Borgmann, The Carefully Orchestrated Campaign, 3 NExus 3, 5-6 (1998).
126. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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to passing incremental restrictions that would gradually undermine the right to
abortion.1 27 When Dr. Martin Haskell presented a lecture at a national conference of
abortion providers, describing a new variation on the most common method of second-
and third-trimester surgical abortions, 128 Johnson and Canady seized upon it. They
believed that the method was a perfect vehicle to provoke moral outrage at abortion
generally. A description of this procedure would arrest the public's attention, in part
because it was not so disturbing as to cause the public to avert its eyes. 129 Johnson and
Canady coined a deliberately incendiary term for Haskell's method, "partial-birth
abortion." Pursuant to Johnson and Canady's plan, the NRLC circulated model
legislation, along with strategic advice, to all of its state chapters. The state and federal
bans that followed were thus a product of this carefully orchestrated public relations
campaign. 130
The state legislative response mirrored the trajectory of the public debate. The first
ban used medical terminology and did not adhere to the NRLC model.' But the term
"partial-birth abortion" soon took hold in the public discourse and became a lightning
rod in the broader debate over abortion. A wave of "partial-birth abortion" bans swept
through state legislatures, where the legislative testimony and floor debates revealed
how effectively the NRLC's public relations campaign had lit the public's
imagination. 132 Eventually, all but three states introduced bans, and thirty-three states
enacted at least one ban.' 33
Most states do not keep a comprehensive legislative history of their statutes; many
keep no legislative history at all. The Alaska State Legislature, however, maintains
nearly verbatim summaries of its committees' hearings. The testimony given on Alaska
127. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Winter Count: Taking Stock ofAbortion Rights After Casey
and Carhart, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 675, 675-79, 688, 716 (2004).
128. Martin Haskell, Dilation and Extraction for Late Second Trimester Abortion,
Presentation at the National Abortion Federation Risk Management Seminar (Sept. 13, 1992).
129. See Gomey, supra note 125, at 38 (comparing the campaign's depictions of the targeted
procedure, which were "gruesome but not gory," with past unsuccessful reliance on images of
mutilated fetuses, which "never worked quite the way they were supposed to" because they were
too "sickening"); see also WELtIAM SALETAN, BEARING RIGHT: How CONSERVATIVES WON THE
ABORTION WAR 233 (2003).
130. Strossen & Borgmann, supra note 125, at 5-6.
131. See Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187,190-91 (6th Cir. 1997).
132. The bans appeared to respond to public outrage over the procedure. However, in the
three states in which bans were proposed through ballot initiatives (Colorado, Maine, and
Washington), voters rejected the bans. See, e.g., Colorado General Assembly 1998 Ballot
Proposals, Amendment 11: Partial-Birth Abortion, available at
http://www.state.co.us/govdir/legdir/csstaff/ballot/text- 11.htm.
133. The vast majority enacted bans that closely followed the NRLC model. See Am. Civil
Liberties Union, supra note 1 (offering a comprehensive list of state abortion bans along with
citations to litigation challenging the bans).
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HB 65, "An Act Related to 'Partial-Birth Abortions,"' in March of 1997 134 is
representative of what other state legislative committees across the nation heard. 35
The House Judiciary Committee hearings on the Alaska bill included seventeen
witnesses who testified in support of the ban and five who opposed it. Many of the
witnesses testified by telephone, an option not uncommon in rural states. The witnesses
supporting the ban included the committee chair, the bill's sponsor and his legislative
aide, nine concerned citizens, two officials of the Alaska Republican party (one of
whom testified "as a parent and a grandparent"), 36 two representatives of Alaska Right
to Life, and one former "post-abortion" counselor.137 Witnesses opposing the ban
included two representatives of the Alaska Civil Liberties Union, one physician who
did not perform abortions, a representative of the Alaska Women's Lobby, and one
concerned citizen.' 38
The hearings elicited virtually no reliable medical testimony about abortion
procedures. Committee members directed many medically related questions to one of
the Alaska Civil Liberties Union representatives, who repeatedly reminded the
committee that she was not a physician. 139 The sole doctor to testify was not able to
speak to all of the relevant medical issues, since he did not himself provide
abortions. 14 The lone citizen to testify against the ban asked the committee whether
any doctors in Alaska performed the targeted procedure, but none could answer that
question. 14
1
Most of the medically related testimony that the committee did hear reflected bald
hearsay, clearly drawn from what witnesses had learned through the media or NRLC
campaign materials. For example, one Republican party official "shared a story of a
woman who gave birth to a child with multiple impairments" who was "alive and well"
and "a joy to his mother." 142 She also "referred to an article in the 'Wall Street
Journal' that she said "contains some of the [medical] truths about partial-birth
abortions."' 143 The Executive Director of Alaska Right to Life "offered $500, out of his
pocket, to the first person" to give evidence of a case in which the targeted procedure
was necessary to save a woman's life or health.144 A citizen testified that the medical
134. An Act Relating to Partial-Birth Abortions: H. Judiciary Comm. Meeting on H.B. 65,
20th Leg. (Alaska 1997), available at
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get-single-minute.asp?ch=H&beg-line=0965&end-line=2183&
session=20&comm=JUD&date=19970307&time=1308 [hereinafter Alaska Comm Meeting].
135. See, e.g., Partial Birth Abortions; Prohibition: H.R. Comm. on Government Reform &
States' Rights Meeting on H.B. 2191, 43rd Leg., 1st Sess. (Ariz. 1997), available at
http://www.azleg.gov/FommtDocumtasp?inDoc--Ilegtext431eg/1R/corrnmin/House/0211 %2D
1%2EGRS.htm.
136. SeeAlaska Comm Meeting, supra note 134 (testimony of Barbara Rawalt, Financial Chair,
District 35, Republican Party of Alaska).
137. See Alaska Comm. Meeting, supra note 134.
138. See id.
139. See id (testimony of Amy Skilbred, Alaska Civil Liberties Union).
140. See id. (testimony of Dr. Peter Nakamura, Director, Division of Public Health,
Department of Health and Social Services).
141. See id. (testimony of Ernie Line).
142. Id. (testimony of Debra Joslin, Chair, District 35, Republican Party of Alaska).
143. Id.
144. Id. (testimony of Art Hippler, Executive Director, Alaska Right to Life).
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profession had "cut its own throat" because it allowed abortion providers to "perform
unjustified abortions" and "falsify the patient's records" in order to secure a "pre-
arranged convenience for the mother and a financial benefit for the doctor."'14 Yet
another citizen suggested that the medical protocol of the targeted procedure called for
manipulating the fetus into a breech (feet-first) position "so that it will not scream
before the procedure is completed."'146
Much of the testimony addressed moral, rather than medical, concerns. 147 Many
witnesses confessed moral outrage at the targeted procedure. A Republican party
official and Right to Life representative claimed that "[i]f people attempted to do this
procedure on a rat, animal rights activists would say it was inhumane.' 148 Two citizens
testified that the targeted procedure reminded them of the Nazi Holocaust.149 Another
citizen urged that the procedure be called "partial-birth infanticide," as it amounted to
"the murdering of a defenseless baby."'150
This spectacle contrasted sharply with the sober, medically oriented trial court
proceedings on the bans. Out of twenty-two trial courts to consider "partial-birth
abortion" bans, twenty invalidated them as unconstitutional on the grounds that they
were vague, lacked a health exception, and/or imposed an undue burden.' Virtually
all of the witnesses who testified in these trials were doctors, clinic directors, and other
medical personnel. For example, in the federal challenge to Rhode Island's ban, the
court determined the medical facts by relying "primarily on the testimony of three
doctors who were certified as experts in abortion practice" and on the defendant's
witness, also a physician.15 2
In contrast to the legislators who enacted the bans, the judges who considered the
legal challenges received a considerable education in medical practice and terminology
in general, and in obstetric and gynecological practice in particular. The trajectory of
their learning is evidenced in the trial transcripts. In the trial challenging Michigan's
"partial-birth abortion" ban, the first such trial in the country, Judge Gerald E. Rosen of
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan began with a
limited knowledge of female anatomy. Early in the trial he agreed that it would be
helpful if plaintiff Dr. Mark Evans were to draw a diagram of a uterus on an easel.
When Dr. Evans sketched a very large uterus, the judge asked, "Can you give me some
145. Id. (testimony of Sharylee Zachary).
146. Id. (testimony of Sid Heidersdorf).
147. See id.
148. Id. (testimony of Virginia Phillips, Spokesperson for American Indians and Alaska
Natives, National Right to Life, Chair, District 2, Republican Party of Alaska).
149. See id. (testimony of Bachar Ben'Israel; testimony of Sid Heidersdorf).
150. Id. (testimony of Tom Gordy).
151. See Am. Civil Liberties Union, supra note 1 (summarizing and citing cases). This
number includes one ban, Ohio's, that did not use the term "partial-birth abortion." See id. A
twenty-first trial court, in Georgia, approved a settlement limiting the ban's application to post-
viability abortions. See id. Only the federal district court in Wisconsin refused to enjoin that
state's ban. See id.
152. R.I. Med. Soc'y v. Whitehouse, 66 F. Supp. 2d 288,295 (D.R.I. 1999), aff'd, 239 F.3d
104 (1st Cir. 2001).
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idea what the scale-I'm sure that's not to scale. Can you give me some idea.... Dr.
Evans responded, to courtroom laughter, "Perhaps in an elephant,"' 15 3
Like the other trial judges, Judge Rosen was subjected to a barrage of medical
evidence. The plaintiffs' experts testified in detail about how they performed abortions,
explaining and using medical terminology and oftentimes illustrating with sketches,
medical instruments, or plastic models of the female reproductive organs. The
following testimony from Dr. Evans in the Michigan trial is representative:
I'm now going to show you the cervix head on. Okay, we started out looking at a
cervix that was like that. Okay? And with the dilipan, we can enlarge it to
something like that. So the opening is now an inch and a half or two inches wide.
And again, depending upon the gestational age will determine how much we need.
If I'm doing a 10 week suction abortion, I only need half an inch; okay? If I'm
doing a twenty week D&E, I'd generally like the biggest dilatation I can get, which
fundamentally I like an inch and a half to two inches, which we can do with
dilators if the dilipan haven't gotten us up quite as far as we need to.154
Judge Rosen, like many of the judges, showed significant engagement with the issues,
initiating long colloquies with the witnesses. He hired his own independent expert, Dr.
Timothy Johnson, to help him better understand the medical issues at stake.
When the Supreme Court decided Nebraska's ban in Stenberg v. Carhart,155 the
Court did not even consider deferring to the legislature on the disputed facts, instead
relying extensively, and exclusively, on the trial record. 156 The Court's disregard of the
legislative record in a majority opinion joined by Justice O'Connor contrasted notably
with Justice O'Connor's earlier claim in City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health that the state legislatures are adept at evaluating abortion
procedures. In her dissenting opinion in Akron, Justice O'Connor had argued that state
legislatures were better positioned to assess the medical facts surrounding abortion as
compared with the Court, which lacked "the resources available to those bodies
entrusted with making legislative choices."' 57
The congressional hearings, which took place over a period of eight years, were
more extensive than those held in the states and included more testimony by medical
professionals. However, they added nothing significant to the evidence heard in the
approximately two-week-long trials.158 Moreover, the congressional hearings included
153. Trial Transcript at 115, Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (No. 97-
71246) (transcribing proceedings on May 5, 1997). He then explained that in humans a non-
pregnant, adult uterus is only about two to three inches long, and even at twenty weeks of
pregnancy is only about ten to twelve inches long. Id. at 116.
154. Id. at 116.
155. Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart1), 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
156. See id. at 921-46.
157. 462 U.S. 416, 456 & n.4 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's
confidence in state legislatures' fact-finding competence is particularly noteworthy in light of
her tenure in the Arizona Senate.
158. See Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(noting that the district court "heard more evidence during its trial than Congress heard over the
span of eight years").
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inflammatory, non-medical testimony from lay witnesses on both sides. 159 Testimony
against the ban included women who had terminated wanted pregnancies under tragic
circumstances. 160 Testimony for the ban included that of a nurse who claimed to have
worked for Dr. Haskell and to have observed a twenty-six-week-old fetus in distress
during one of his abortions. 16' The medical evidence in support of the ban, upon which
Congress relied exclusively for its findings, came from physicians who had never
performed the targeted procedure and many of whom had never performed an
abortion. 62 Much testimony was devoted to issues legally irrelevant but emotionally
laden, such as whether fetuses feel pain during abortion procedures. 163
As with the state bans, the court proceedings on the federal ban played out very
differently. Free of the advocacy-oriented rhetoric that punctuated the congressional
hearings, the parties enjoyed the comparative luxury of a fair process and the court's
serious attention to the factual issues. In Carhart v. Gonzales, the trial took place over
two weeks. The district court heard testimony from twenty-three physicians, nineteen
of whom testified about the relative safety of the banned procedures. Two medical
organizations, including the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
testified by deposition.64Also before the district court (but not Congress) was a peer-
reviewed study that found intact D&E procedures were just as safe as traditional
procedures. 165 The district court's opinion was 474 pages long and summarized both
the trial record and the entire congressional record on the ban. 16
In a second, parallel challenge to the federal ban, 167 the trial testimony was just as
detailed. A reporter described some of the testimony:
159. See Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 1019 (N.D.
Cal. 2004) (stating that "the oral testimony before Congress was not only unbalanced, but
intentionally polemic"); Brief of Amici Curiae, 52 Members of Congress in Support of Planned
Parenthood Federation, Inc., et al., and Motion for Leave to File Brief Out of Time in Support
of Respondents LeRoy Carhart, M.D., et al., In Related Case No. 05-380 at 9-10, Gonzales v.
Carhart (Carhart I1), 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) (Nos. 05-1382, 05-380), 2006 WL 2736635
(noting that congressional "findings" in the federal ban were drafted by the majority before
additional hearings were held, and the subsequent testimony "was politically biased and
transparently partisan, calculated to highlight testimony from supporters of the ban").
160. See Planned Parenthood Fed'n ofAm., 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1015-16.
161. Id. at 1015 (discussing testimony of Brenda Pratt Shafer).
162. See id. at 1018-19.
163. See id. at 1019 n.44. This hotly contested issue was not relevant, and the trial courts
therefore did not consider it, because the Act claimed to ban only one procedure while
permitting others, and there was no claim that the permitted methods would be less painful.
164. Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 809, 852 & n. 28 (D. Neb. 2004), aff'dsub
nom. Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
165. Stephen T. Chasen, Robin B. Kalish, Meruka Gupta, Jane E. Kaufman, William K.
Rashbaum & Frank A. Chervenak, Dilation and Evacuation at > 20 Weeks. Comparison of
Operative Techniques, 190 Am. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1180, 1180-83 (2004).
166. See Carhart, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1012. The trial court found that both the trial record
and "the record Congress itself compiled" disproved Congress's finding of a "medical
consensus" that intact D&Es were never necessary. Id. at 1012.
167. See Planned Parenthood Fed'n ofAm., 320 F. Supp. 2d 957.
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[Plaintiffs' attorney] asked [Dr. Maureen] Paul to explain the steps in a typical
dilation and evacuation, which is the most common method for second-trimester
abortion, and is generally referred to as D&E. "Can I use the diagram?" Paul
asked. Propped beside the witness stand was a large cross-section of the female
reproductive organs. Paul indicated the cervix, the uterine opening, where, in a
D&E patient, several dilators called laminaria would have been inserted the day
before and left to swell. "I use a small forceps to remove the laminaria, if they are
in place," she said, and then explained how that was done. "I break the bag of
water, either by just breaking it and allowing it to drain---the fluid to drain out--or
using suction.' 68
In the trial court proceedings on both the state and federal bans, the fact that the judges
were obliged to sit through the trials, and were not responding to the testimony with
politically driven sound bites meant to influence colleagues and impress lobbyists or
the public, gave the plaintiffs sufficient confidence to put difficult and explicit medical
evidence before the courts. The plaintiffs' willingness to do so evidenced a remarkable
trust in the judicial process and the judges' ability to view the evidence impartially.
Even the appellate arguments reflected a sophisticated level of attention to the
medical facts. As Linda Greenhouse wrote about the oral arguments on the federal ban
in the Supreme Court:
There were moments ... [when] the proceedings seemed more like a medical
school seminar than an appellate argument. Such familiar constitutional concepts
as the right to privacy were not mentioned during the two hours, but the methods
doctors use to dilate a pregnant woman's cervix were discussed in detail,
repeatedly. 169
The disparity in the level of attention paid to the medical facts by courts and
legislatures considering the "partial-birth abortion" bans cannot be attributed to
politics. The judges who presided over the "partial-birth abortion" trials were far from
uniformly liberal. In fact, of the thirteen federal district judges to have enjoined
"partial-birth abortion" bans as of 1998, six (including Judge Rosen) were appointed
by Republican presidents. 170 Some expressed personal revulsion, or at least
reservations, about the topic they were addressing. Judge Casey, for example, wrote,
"The Court finds that the testimony at trial and before Congress establishes that [the
targeted procedure is] gruesome, brutal, barbaric, and uncivilized ... ,17
168. Gorney, supra note 125, at 34.
169. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Hear Arguments on Late-Term Abortion, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov.
9, 2006, at A25.
170. Strossen & Borgmann, supra note 125, at 19 n.4. Judge Rosen was appointed by
President George H. W. Bush and served on the Board of Directors of the Michigan Chapter of
the Federalist Society. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Judge
Gerald E. Rosen Biography,
http://www.mied.uscourts.gov/Judges/guidelines/topic.cfin?topic id=229.
171. Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). The
Associated Press reported that, during the trial, "Judge Casey asked a doctor if doctors ever hear
a baby cry during an abortion. He asked the same doctor if a mother can detect in advance that a
baby will be born blind." Associated Press, Richard Conway Casey, 74, Blind Federal Judge,
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Nevertheless, despite his obvious personal opposition to abortion, Judge Caseyjoined
the two other federal trial judges in declaring the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban
Act of 2003 unconstitutional. 17
2
When it considered the federal ban, however, the Supreme Court declined to defer
to the trial court's findings. 173 Justice Kennedy conceded that Congress's formal
findings of fact were riddled with errors, and therefore he disavowed deferring to them
completely.' 74 In fact, he recognized that "[t]he Court retains an independent
constitutional duty to review factual findings where constitutional rights are at
stake."'175 Yet the Court's ultimate factual conclusion, that credible medical authority
was evenly divided as to whether the banned methods were the safest in some
circumstances, did not match what the trial court had found. As David Faigman notes,
despite the agreement of all three lower courts regarding the health risks imposed by
the ban, Justice Kennedy found that there was substantial medical disagreement over
this question:
In truth, however, this so-called medical disagreement was on the level of such
scientific disagreements as evolution versus intelligent design and the reality of
global warming .... The "scientific" debate over this procedure was largely
manufactured by Congress .... Nonetheless, Kennedy relied on this "uncertainty"
to support his conclusion that "the Act can survive this facial attack.', 76
The Court's decision to give equal weight to Congress's assessment of the medical
facts provided the crucial factor distinguishing the outcomes in Carhart I and Carhart
II.
B. Sexual Orientation and Parenting
Society's treatment of gay parenting is a controversial issue that has appeared in
legislatures and courts in the context of bans on same-sex marriage and on adoption by
prospective gay and lesbian parents. The outcomes for plaintiffs challenging these laws
Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2007, at B7.
172. See Nat 'lAbortion Fed'n, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 493; Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d
805, 1047 (D. Neb 2004), aff'dsub noma. Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005),
rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007); Planned Parenthood Fed'n ofAm., 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1034-35
(striking down federal ban in response to separate challenges to it).
173. See Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart I1), 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1646 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing majority's failure to defer to trial court's factual findings).
174. See id. at 1637-38.
175. Id. at 1637 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60 (1932)).
176. FAIGMAN, supra note 24, at 60; see also Tobin, supra note 58, at 134 (noting that for
the Court in Carhart II, "the question was not so much one of whether particular findings were
correct, but of leaving to [Congress] '[c]onsiderations of marginal safety, including the balance
of risks' (quoting Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124) (second alteration in original)). Faigman elsewhere
describes Kennedy's deferential approach as "moving the frame of reference from reviewable
[(i.e., social)] facts to case-specific [(i.e., adjudicative)] facts," a shift that effectively renders it
impossible to mount a successful challenge. FAIGMAN, supra note 24, at 85; see also B. Jessie
Hill, The Constitutional Right to Make Medical Treatment Decisions: A Tale of Two Doctrines,
86 TEX. L. REv. 277, 323 (2007) (making a similar point concerning the Court's rejection of a
facial attack in favor of as-applied challenges).
[Vol. 84:1
RETHINKING JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
have turned in large measure on whether the courts deferred to the actual or presumed
legislative fact-finding supporting the laws.
Many of the laws that prohibit marriage or adoption by gay people existed long
before they were challenged and lack a legislative record for the courts to consider.
Courts examining them, however, have sometimes credited the legislatures with
enacting the laws based upon "rational" factual assumptions having nothing to do with
bias against gay and lesbian people, rather than (1) entertaining the possibility that
animus or ignorance may have played a role and (2) conducting any serious inquiry
into the key factual issues.
Not only have some courts willingly supplied a potentially pretextual rationale for
the legislatures' choices, but they have seemed unconcerned about whether this
rationale was grounded in fact. In Hernandez v. Robles, New York's highest court
recently held that the state's failure to allow same-sex marriage did not violate the New
York Constitution.177 The court first speculated why the legislature might have limited
the privilege of marriage to heterosexual couples. It hypothesized that "[t]he
Legislature could rationally believe that it is better, other things being equal, for
children to grow up with both a mother and a father." 178
The court was ready to accept this hypothetical rationale, even though it might have
been based on nothing more than personal impressions, noting, "Intuition and
experience suggest that a child benefits from having before his or her eyes, every day,
living models of what both a man and a woman are like."1 7 9 Although the plaintiffs and
supporting amici argued otherwise and offered social science studies debunking any
advantage to heterosexual parenting, the court was unmoved. The court recognized that
this critical factual issue was in dispute, yet it sided with the legislature. Moreover, far
from requiring the government to establish a legitimate factual basis for the legislation,
the court held the plaintiffs to an impossible standard, observing that the plaintiffs'
studies "on their face do not establish beyond doubt that children fare equally well in
same-sex and opposite-sex households" and that "[p]laintiffs have not persuaded us
that this long-accepted restriction is a wholly irrational one, based solely on ignorance
and prejudice against homosexuals."' ' 80
A challenge to Florida's prohibition on adoption by gay parents met a similar fate in
federal court.'8' In Lofion v. Secretary ofDepartment of Children and Family Services,
177. See Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006).
178. Id. at 7.
179. Id. (emphasis added); see also id. ("In the absence of conclusive scientific evidence, the
Legislature could rationally proceed on the commonsense premise that children will do best with
a mother and father in the home."). Chief Judge Kaye objected to the court's reliance on
intuition, noting that "[j]ust 10 years before Loving declared unconstitutional state laws banning
marriage between persons of different races, 96% of Americans were opposed to interracial
marriage" on the grounds that it was "unnatural" and dangerous to civilization. Id. at 24-25
(Kaye, C.J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 8 (emphasis added). The court conceded that "[i]f we were convinced that the
restriction plaintiffs attack were founded on nothing but prejudice.., we would hold it invalid,
no matter how long its history." Id.
181. According to the district court, "In 1977, Florida became the first state to statutorily ban
adoption by gay or lesbian adults by enacting the homosexual adoption provision. Currently, it
is the only state with such a prohibition." Lofton v. Keamey, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1374 n.1
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both the trial and appellate courts deferred to the legislature on the factual issue central
to the challenge: whether any facts supported the law's purported goal of protecting
children and providing them with stable homes. 8 2 The district court granted summary
judgment to the defendants, finding that "it is 'arguable' that placing children in
married homes is in the best interest of Florida's children for the reasons stated by
Defendants" and that it was irrelevant if this assumption were false. I8 3
The district court reached this conclusion despite the governing standard for
summary judgment, which it recognized placed the burden of demonstrating the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact upon the defendants and required the court
to "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."' 84 The
defendants conceded that, with respect to "what material fact issues exist, Plaintiffs are
entitled to have their evidence taken as true and also to all reasonable inferences
flowing from it."' 85 The Eleventh Circuit too claimed that it would "view all evidence
and factual inferences" in favor of the plaintiffs. 8 6 In the end, however, both courts
ignored the significance of the case's procedural posture and took the rational basis
standard to mean that they must side with the government on the facts.
For example, the Eleventh Circuit panel stated that "appellants have offered no
competent evidence" to show the falsity of Florida's premise that "the marital family
structure is more stable than other household arrangements and that children benefit
from the presence of both a father and a mother in the home."'1 7 Indeed, the court
characterized the state's premise as an "unprovable assumption[].' ' 8 However, the
court had before it evidence discrediting the assertion that adoption by lesbian or gay
parents harms children. 8 9
Faced with material facts clearly in dispute, the court abdicated responsibility for
resolving the factual question, concluding that this task was one for the legislature:
"Although the influence of environmental factors in forming patterns of sexual
behavior and the importance of heterosexual role models are matters of ongoing
debate, they ultimately involve empirical disputes not readily amenable to judicial
resolution-as well as policy judgments best exercised in the legislative arena."'19 The
court thus seemed to suggest that legislatures, rather than courts, are the proper venues
for resolving empirical disputes, even where important individual rights are at stake.' 9'
(S.D. Fla. 2001), aff'dsub nom. Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d
804 (11 th Cir. 2004).
182. Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 826 (1lth Cir.
2004) (agreeing with trial court's decision to defer to legislature), aff'g Lofton, 157 F. Supp. 2d
at 1372.
183. Lofton, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1383-84 (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S.
307, 320 (1993)).
184. Id. at 1377.
185. Brief of Appellees at 13, Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 358
F.3d 804 (1 1th Cir. 2004) (No. 01-16723-DD), 2002 WL 32868748.
186. Lofion, 358 F.3d at 809.
187. Id. at 819.
188. Id. (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 62-63).
189. Appellants' Reply Brief at 3, Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children and Family Servs.,
358 F.3d 804 (1 th Cir. 2004) (No. 01-16723-DD).
190. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 822 (emphasis added).
191. The court implied that only certain kinds of empirical disputes-those subject to"ongoing debate"--fall within the category of disputes best left to the legislature. It is unclear
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The court's lumping of "empirical disputes" (or at least certain kinds of "empirical
disputes") with "policy judgments" helped bolster the apparent appropriateness of
leaving the dispute to the legislature. 192
A contrasting conclusion on the issue of gay parenting, however, was reached by the
Arkansas courts in Department of Human Services v. Howard.19 3 In Howard, plaintiffs
successfully challenged an Arkansas regulation enacted by the state's Child Welfare
Agency Review Board that prohibited gay people from becoming foster parents.194 In
this case, the state trial court did not presume that a factual basis for the restriction
existed. Because it was reviewing the action of an administrative agency, the court had
to determine whether the agency acted within its "authority to enact rules and
regulations that promote the health, safety, and welfare of children."' 195 The trial court
issued numerous factual findings, which included the following: that "[b]ased on its
foster care statistics the defendants do not know of any reason that lesbians and gay
men would be unsuitable to be foster parents"; that "the blanket exclusion may be
harmful to promoting children's healthy adjustment because it excludes a pool of
effective foster parents"; and that being raised by gay parents does not increase the risk
of "problems in adjustment," "psychological problems," "behavioral problems,""academic problems," "or gender identity problems. '96
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that defendants' argument "that the
regulation protects the healthy [sic], safety, and welfare of foster children.. . flies in
the face of the evidence presented by Appellees' experts and the [trial] court's findings
of fact."'197 Because the trial court did not presume that a factual basis for the
legislation existed, but instead conducted an independent review of the facts, it ruled
against the defendants even though it applied a rational basis standard of review. The
Arkansas Supreme Court credited the trial court's fact-finding, rather than deferring to
the administrative agency's view of the facts, and affirmed the ruling of
unconstitutionality. 198 The courts' refusal to defer to the lawmakers' fact-finding was
essential to plaintiffs' victory in Howard and led to an outcome directly counter to the
results in Lofton and Hernandez. 199
what the court means by this. The word "dispute" itself implies that a question is unsettled, so"ongoing debate" adds little clarification. But, given its reference to policy judgments, and the
types of factual issues in dispute here, the court was likely referring to general, presumably
controversial, social or behavioral science issues. See infra text accompanying note 299
(discussion refuting idea that legislatures are better at resolving the empirical aspects of these
disputes).
192. See generally supra text accompanying notes 37-41 (distinguishing between
legislatures' policymaking and empirical fact-finding). Despite this assertion, the court did go
on to resolve the factual issues, discrediting plaintiffs' evidence with studies not relied upon by
either party. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 825 nn.24-25.
193. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Howard, 238 S.W.3d I (Ark. 2006).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 6.
196. Id. at 7 (referencing trial court's findings of fact).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 7-8.
199. Shortly before this Article went to press, a state trial court in Florida ruled that the
state's law barring lesbians and gay men from adopting violates the Florida Constitution by
singling out gay people, and children raised by them, for different treatment without rational
basis. In re Adoption of John Doe and James Doe, slip op. at 51-52 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 25,
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An opinion by a Hawaii state trial court, declaring unconstitutional the state's
200prohibition on same-sex marriage, further demonstrates the decisive role played by
judicial fact-finding in the context of gay parenting. In Baehr v. Miike, the state
asserted a compelling interest, among others, "in protecting the health and welfare of
children."20' The court heard testimony from expert witnesses on both sides, including
psychiatrists, psychologists, and sociologists, who testified about child development,
"demographics related to family and children," and related topics. 20 2 The court's
opinion included a detailed summary of this testimony, followed by twenty-five
numbered findings of fact. These findings included the court's conclusions that "[g]ay
and lesbian parents and same-sex couples can provide children with a nurturing
relationship and a nurturing environment which is conducive to the development of
happy, healthy and well-adjusted children., 20 3 The court found that "[g]ay and lesbian
parents and same-sex couples can be as fit and loving parents, as non-gay men and
women and different-sex couples." 2° In short, the court concluded, "Defendant has
failed to establish or prove that the public interest in the well-being of children and
families, or the optimal development of children will be adversely affected by same-sex
marriage.205
C. Children and "Indecency" on the Internet
"Indecency" on the Internet is yet another provocative topic that reveals a marked
contrast between legislation enacted without serious regard for the relevant factual
issues and a court's independent and thorough investigation of those issues. American
Civil Liberties Union v. Reno206 addressed provisions of the Communications Decency
2008) (case number redacted). Unlike the federal district court in Lofton, which deferred to the
legislature's findings and declined to review the relevant facts independently, the state court
held a four-day trial in which it heard from numerous experts on children's health and
development. Id. at 2-3, 10-30. In light of this evidence, the court rejected the factual
assumptions the state offered to justify the ban. The court found that many reports and studies,"adopted and ratified by the American Psychological Association, the American Psychiatry
Association, the American Pediatric Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the
Child Welfare League of America, and the National Association of Social Workers,"
demonstrate "beyond dispute that ... the best interests of children are not preserved by
prohibiting homosexual adoption." Id. at 35-37.
200. See Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
As directed by the Hawaii Supreme Court, see Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), the
trial court applied strict scrutiny to the statute, which was challenged under the state
constitution. Baehr, 1996 WL 694235, at *2. Hawaii voters later approved a Defense of
Marriage constitutional amendment, mooting the lawsuit. National Conference of State
Legislatures, Same Sex Marriage, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/samesex.htm.
201. Baehr, 1996 WL 694235, at *3.
202. Id. at *4-* 16.
203. Id. at *17.
204. Id.
205. Id. at *18.
206. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), afid, 521 U.S. 844 (2007). The
lower court decision was issued by a three-judge panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (2000).
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Act of 1996 (CDA),207 which criminalized knowingly making, creating, soliciting, or
initiating the transmission of any "indecent" or "patently offensive" communication to
a minor "by means of a telecommunications device." 20 8
The paucity of the legislative record supporting the CDA suggests that the Act was
motivated by public fear and political pressure, and not by any empirically based
assessment of the issue.2 09 One commentator describes the bill's history and the
Senate's failure to conduct any real investigation into the factual issues raised by the
bill:
During [the entire time the bill was under discussion,] there were no hearings to
collect information, to hear from experts on the Internet regarding its operation
and capabilities, to find out how the bill would affect protected speech and
communication, or to ascertain whether the perceived dangers could be countered
by other means. Rather, there were extensive private discussions held with, and
pressure imposed by, both the religious right-wing groups who were actively
supporting the CDA, on the one hand, and a combination of liberal and media
groups opposing the CDA, on the other.210
The final version of the CDA was proposed in the Senate on June 14, 1995.211 Two
hours of debate were allotted.21 2 In introducing the amendment, Senator Exon of
Nebraska referred to the "blue book" of pornographic online images he had compiled,
offering it to his colleagues for inspection.21 3 In the course of the debate, senators
supporting and opposing the bill offered petitions, letters from advocacy groups, and
newspaper articles into the record.214When the bill moved to the House, a different
version excluding the prohibitory provisions of the CDA was approved. Following the
appointment of a conference committee, Congress finally passed the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, which included prohibitions similar to those
215originally approved by the Senate.
On July 24, 1995-shortly after the CDA's passage in the Senate, but included in
the legislative history of the Telecommunications Act-the Senate Judiciary
Committee held a hearing in connection with the Protection of Children from
Computer Pornography Act of 1995. 216 The witnesses included a stalker victim; "two
207. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000).
208. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 828-29 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B), (d)(1)).
209. For a detailed recounting of the legislative path of the CDA, and the context in which it
was enacted, see MICHAEL A. BAMBERGER, RECKLESS LEGISLATION: How LAWMAKERS IGNORE
THE CONSTIrUTION 42-50 (2000).
210. Id. at46.
211. See 141 CONG. REC. 16,006 (1995).
212. Id. at 16,008.
213. Id. at 16,009.
214. See id. at 16,010-26. At the end of the debate, the CDA was added to the
Telecommunications Act by a vote of eighty-four to sixteen. Id. at 16,026. The next day, the
Senate passed the Telecommunications Act. Id. at 16,242.
215. BAMBERGER, supra note 209, at 47.
216. See Cyberporn and Children: The Scope of the Problem, the State of the Technology,
and the Need for Congressional Action: Hearing on S. 892 Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) [hereinafter Cyberporn and Children]. This bill did not pass, and
2009]
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
mothers of children exposed to computer pornography," each of whom testified about
their personal negative experiences with internet pornography; an investigative
journalist who testified about the availability of pornography on the internet; and the
Executive Director of Enough is Enough, an advocacy group committed to the"enactment of new laws to stop the sexual exploitation and victimization of children
using the Internet." 217
In American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, plaintiffs challenged the prohibitory
provisions of the CDA under the First Amendment. 218 After holding "extensive
evidentiary hearings" on a motion for preliminary injunction, the three-judge panel
issued 123 findings of fact.219 The panel's findings contradicted many of the
government's factual assertions. For example, the government argued that the CDA
offered Internet content providers three defenses to prosecution: "credit card
verification, adult verification by password or adult identification number, and
'tagging. 220 But the panel found that these defenses were for the most part neither
technically nor economically feasible.22'
Relying on the court's findings of fact, then-Chief Judge Sloviter found that the
plaintiffs met their burden under the preliminary injunction standard by demonstrating
that the challenged provisions of the CDA were facially unconstitutional.222 Because
the prohibition was "patently a government-imposed content-based restriction on
speech, and the speech at issue, whether denominated 'indecent' or 'patently
offensive,' is entitled to constitutional protection," the court applied strict scrutiny.223
Judge Sloviter rejected the government's assertion that the court should defer to the
legislature's factual conclusions, noting that "[w]hatever deference is due legislative
findings [cannot] foreclose our independent judgment of the facts., 224 She rejected
legislative "findings" upon which the government relied, noting that they primarily
consisted of legislators' statements about obscenity and pornography, not "indecent" or
"patently offensive" content, and thus were not material to the legal issues before the
court.
225
The Supreme Court relied extensively upon the district court's findings of fact in
affirming the panel's ruling226 and declined to defer to the legislature on disputed
the hearing was the last action taken on it.
217. Id. at 38, 55, 111; Enough is Enough: Protecting Our Children Online,
http://www.enough.org/inside.php?id=E7A5VT6VM. When Congress revisited the issue of
protecting children from harm on the Internet, through the Child Online Protection Act (COPA),
47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000), it again failed to hold hearings. Following protracted litigation, a
federal district court permanently enjoined COPA from enforcement. See ACLU v. Gonzales,
478 F. Supp. 2d 775 (E.D. Pa. 2007), af6'd, 534 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2008).
218. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 826 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). The
lower court decision was issued by a three-judge panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (2000).
219. See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 830-49.
220. Id. at 846.
221. See id. at 846-47.
222. See id. at 849.
223. Id. at 851 (opinion of Sloviter, C.J.).
224. Id. at 853 (opinion of Sloviter, C.J.) (internal quotation omitted) (quoting Sable
Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989)).
225. Id. at 853 (opinion of Sloviter, C.J.).
226. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (citing panel's findings of fact twenty-two
times).
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issues of fact.22 7 Writing for the seven-Justice majority, Justice Stevens noted that the
court's "extensive findings of fact... describe the character and the dimensions of the
Internet, the availability of sexually explicit material in that medium, and the problems
confronting age verification for recipients of Internet communications" and observed
that the factual findings "provide the underpinnings for the legal issues., 228 In contrast,
Justice Stevens noted the incongruity between the importance of the
Telecommunications Act and Congress's cavalier attitude toward the factual issues
underlying the CDA.229
As in the Arkansas and Hawaii decisions addressing gay parenting, the courts'
refusal to defer to the legislature's assessment of the constitutionally-significant facts in
Reno was critical to the plaintiffs' victory. The case again demonstrates the courts'
marked superiority over the legislatures in fact-finding. It also underscores the pivotal
role played by courts' determinations over whether to defer to legislative fact-finding.
III. A CRITIQUE OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO LEGISLATIVE FACT-FINDING
The courts' reluctance to engage in independent fact-finding is unfounded when a
law threatens essential individual rights and liberties. The courts play a vital role within
the constitutional structure in protecting basic individual rights, especially minority and
unpopular rights, from majoritarian power. In order to play this role effectively, they
must be unconstrained in their ability to ascertain the factual basis for legislation. And,
as it happens, courts possess institutional advantages over legislatures in fact-finding,
especially in this context. They are better positioned to conduct fact-finding with
integrity, producing a more reliable and less biased factual record.
A. Institutional Legitimacy
Independent judicial review of constitutionally-significant facts goes in tandem with
the importance ofjudicial review more generally when basic personal liberties are at
issue. The courts provide a critical backstop when legislatures act to restrict such
rights. This is especially so when laws intrude upon the rights of unpopular or
dispossessed minorities. The courts have reason in this context to be suspicious of the
legislature's motives. As part of the courts' responsibility to protect such interests from
227. See, e.g., id. at 876 ("In arguing that the CDA does not so diminish adult
communication, the Government relies on the incorrect factual premise that prohibiting a
transmission whenever it is known that one of its recipients is a minor would not interfere with
adult-to-adult communication. The findings of the District Court make clear that this premise is
untenable.").
228. Id. at 849.
229. See id. at 858 n.24. The Court quoted Senator Leahy's observation:
It really struck me... that it is the first ever hearing, and ... yet we had a major
debate on the floor, passed legislation overwhelmingly on a subject involving the
Internet, legislation that could dramatically change--some would say even wreak
havoc---on the Internet. The Senate went in willy-nilly, passed legislation, and
never once had a hearing, never once had a discussion other than an hour or so on
the floor.
Id. (quoting Cyberporn and Children, supra note 216, at 7-8); see also id. at 875 n.41.
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the tyranny of the majority, they must satisfy themselves that the factual premises
supporting the legislation are sound. As Jesse Choper has written:
Since, almost by definition, the processes of democracy bode ill for the security of
personal rights and, as experience shows, such liberties are not infrequently
endangered by popular majorities, the task of custodianship has been and should
be assigned to a governing body that is insulated from political responsibility and
unbeholden to self-absorbed and excited majoritarianism. 230
Of course, how one defines "basic individual rights" is an important and difficult
question, a detailed exploration of which is beyond the scope of this Article. As
Choper points out, "The principled delineation and interpretation of the judicially
enforceable constitutional rights held by individuals against popular government is an
awesomely perplexing responsibility for the Court. Yet determining its competence to
do so vis-A-vis other institutions of state and national government probably represents
the Court's most profound obligation." 231 The federal courts should not be obligated to
conduct an independent review of the facts any time a person alleges her personal
rights are violated by a law no matter how trivial the right asserted. Important or basic
individual rights should include something like what Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum,
and others building upon their work have called "capabilities," the conditions
necessary for a good human life or for "human flourishing." 232 Fleshing out exactly
what is necessary for human flourishing will itselfbe complex and controversial.233 For
example, one might ask whether all claims under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment should qualify as "basic individual rights." Some such claims may qualify,
while others may not. The taking of homes owned by individuals of modest means and
turning those properties over to a private developer seems plausibly to implicate rights
necessary for human flourishing.234 On the other hand, it is far less clear that restricting
230. JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEw AND THENATIONALPOLITIcALPROCESS 68 (1980);
see also FAIGMAN, supra note 24, at 175-76; Caitlin E. Borgmann, Legislative Arrogance and
ConstitutionalAccountability, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 753, 801 (2006); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The
Core of an Uneasy Casefor Judicial Review, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1706-08 (2008); Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Judicial Independence: The Situation of the US. Federal Judiciary, 85 NEB. L.
REV. 1, 13 (2006); Douglas Laycock, A Syllabus of Errors, 105 MICH. L. REv. 1169, 1174
(reviewing MARCi A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAw (2005)).
231. CHOPER, supra note 230, at 77-78.
232. MARTHA C. NuSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HuMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES
APPROACH 11-15 (2000); Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in ThE QUALrrY OFLIFE 30,
47 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993). See generally THE QUALITY OF LIFE,
supra. Martha Nussbaum's theory builds upon, and gives more substance to, the rights set forth
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See Michael Ashley Stein, Disability Human
Rights, 95 CAL. L. REv. 75, 94-101 (2007).
233. See Robert Post, Democracy and Equality, 603 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCL,
24, 32-34 (2006); cf. Stein, supra note 232 (amending and critiquing Nussbaum's capabilities
approach in articulating disability human rights paradigm).
234. But see Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 488 (2005) (upholding such a
taking and declaring, "[w]hen the legislature's purpose is legitimate and its means are not
irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom oftakings-no less than
debates over the wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic legislation-are not to be carried out
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uses of property intended to be developed for commercial gain to protect the
environment, or to save lives and property, intrudes upon a basic individual right.
235
The categories of rights established by the Supreme Court as "fundamental," or as
otherwise specially protected, are not a reliable measure of basic individual rights, or
of when the courts should defer to legislative fact-finding. First, the set of rights the
Court has formally recognized as fundamental or specially protected does not
encompass all of the basic individual rights and liberties necessary for human
flourishing. This is only natural, since the rights essential to human flourishing are not
static or ahistorical.236 A paradigm ofjudicial deference to legislative fact-finding must
be sufficiently flexible to account for evolving rights. It must ensure at least a
minimum protection for such rights, even as their formal legal status remains
undeveloped or uncertain.
Second, the Court itself has moved progressively away from a formal categorization
of rights and corresponding levels of legal scrutiny.237 It is therefore hazardous to rely
upon such categories to determine whether rights should be protected by independent
judicial review of social facts. The Court may be uncertain as to how it should
characterize a particular right or classification. It may be reluctant to pronounce certain
rights, especially those that are controversial or emerging, as "fundamental" rights, or
to apply strict or heightened scrutiny to laws infringing them. Yet, even in such cases,
the Supreme Court often seems to recognize that a basic human value is at stake. Thus,
in cases like Lawrence v. Texas,238 the Court has refrained from identifying the status
of the right at issue or the level of scrutiny it has applied, while still acknowledging
that important human values are implicated. In Lawrence, for example, the Court noted
that a ban on same-sex intimacy implicated individuals' "dignity as free persons" and
observed that, "when sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another
person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more
enduring." 239 Similarly, the Court's traditional two tiers of review (strict scrutiny and
rational basis) have blossomed into a plethora of tests that sometimes view legislation
in the federal courts.") (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Justice O'Connor's
dissent in Kelo saw the problem posed to basic individual rights by unqualified deference to
legislatures in all Takings Clause cases. She objected, "Where is the line between 'public' and'private' property use? We give considerable deference to legislatures' determinations about
what governmental activities will advantage the public. But were the political branches the sole
arbiters of the public-private distinction, the Public Use Clause would amount to little more than
hortatory fluff." Id. at 497 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She further noted,
Any property may now be taken for the benefit of another private party, but the
fallout from this decision will not be random. The beneficiaries are likely to be
those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political process,
including large corporations and development firms. As for the victims, the
government now has license to transfer property from those with fewer resources
to those with more.
Id. at 505 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
235. But see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031-32 (1992) (deeming such
an action to be a "taking" requiring government compensation).
236. See generally NuSSBAUM, supra note 232; Sen, supra note 232.
237. See FAIGMAN, supra note 24, at 130.
238. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
239. Id. at 567.
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strictly even when the legal standard on its face is a lenient one.240 This again is not
surprising given the ever-evolving quality of basic individual rights. But if the courts at
least exercise their responsibility to examine rigorously the social facts relevant to laws
affecting these rights, then the rights will remain better protected and will have the
chance to take root in constitutional jurisprudence.
Wherever the precise boundaries of basic individual rights lie, it is critical that the
federal courts retain the authority to examine the relevant facts independently when
legislatures pass laws that intrude on such rights. While legislatures may be the more
appropriate bodies to formulate broad social policies, their susceptibility to political
influence makes it inappropriate for courts to rely upon them to resolve conflicting
facts when a legislative proposal curtails basic individual rights. In such cases,
legislatures are motivated as always by the political climate and the demands of
constituents and interest groups, but it is precisely when this kind of political pressure
is directed at limiting others' rights that the courts' role becomes vital. It is in these
settings that the courts must step in to guard against the harmful tendencies of the
democratic process. Here, institutional respect for the legislative process weighs less
heavily against the substantial concerns of important individual rights.24'
In other contexts, it is not as clear that a court possesses greater institutional
legitimacy to review the factual support for a statute. In particular, where Congress or a
state legislature seeks to create or protect, rather than curtail, individual rights, there is
less compelling justification for the courts to intercede.242 In these circumstances,
courts may have good reason to grant deference to the legislature's policy choices
without concern as to whether those policy choices rest upon a sound factual footing.2 43
Under our constitutional structure, Congress too plays an important role in protecting
individual rights through the Enforcement Clauses of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments. 2 " In the same way that judicial review reflects a distrust of
legislative power, these constitutional provisions reflect a "distrust of the ability or
240. See, e.g., FAIGMAN, supra note 24, at 102 (noting that in City ofCleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), the Court did not want to "extend stricter scrutiny to
the mentally retarded as a class," yet also did not want to "uphold a law possibly motivated by
prejudice," and therefore shifted the burden of proof to the government without formally
changing the applicable level of scrutiny).
241. Cf Post, supra note 233, at 32-34 (arguing that, rather than being fundamentally at
odds as is often claimed, "strong egalitarian principles can establish a dynamic and dialectical
relationship to democracy" in which "visible and oppressive" inequities "prepare the way for the
eventual emergence of democracy-based arguments for the amelioration of these inequities").
See generally CHOPER, supra note 230.
242. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,657 (1966) (finding "the principle that
calls for the closest scrutiny of distinctions in laws denying fundamental rights" inapplicable to
the Voting Rights Act, which "does not restrict or deny the franchise but in effect extends the
franchise to persons who otherwise would be denied it by state law").
243. See id. at 653 (arguing that where a majority legislatively imposes burdens on itself to
benefit a minority, the same strict scrutiny should not be applied as when the majority burdens
the rights of a minority).
244. See Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 10, at 140-41; Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel,
Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel,
110 YALE L. J. 441,513-22 (2000).
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willingness of courts to enforce fully the constitutional commands. 245 Moreover, in
such contexts, a legislature is not acting in the direct interests of the majority or the
politically influential and is, by definition, not motivated by bias against an unpopular
or politically powerless minority. 246 Thus, it may be appropriate for a court to defer to
a legislature's judgments both "about the state of the world and about appropriate
responses to the societal conditions triggering political action."
247
Of course, not all laws will clearly fall into either the category of protecting or
enhancing basic rights, or of infringing them. Indeed, some laws may create, expand, or
bolster certain individual rights at the expense of others. Where such a law intended to
protect basic individual rights also clearly intrudes on others, the courts should conduct
an independent review of the facts. We should not tolerate laws based on erroneous or
disingenuous fact-finding simply because a legislature's intentions are good. For
example, assume a legislature passes a law forbidding hate speech directed against a
defined group of people. If the legislature makes a wholly speculative and unsupported
factual finding that members of the protected group are ten times more likely to seek
counseling for emotional trauma after confronting the forbidden kinds of speech, it
would not be acceptable for a court to uphold the law on this supposed factual basis.
The law may still be upheld if the government offers other valid grounds for the law in
court. But because the law implicates the basic constitutional right to free speech, it is
the courts' duty to ensure that the law is premised on something other than a bogus
factual foundation.
Other conflicts may be harder to sort out. If a legislature passes an affirmative
action law, and a white student claims she was not admitted to the college of her choice
because of the law, should the court be obligated to review the facts independently?
Here the legislature has acted in a rights-protective way, but it is less clear that it has
infringed the rights of a particular white student. 248 Even if it has, one might ask
whether it matters if the law has only indirectly infringed the student's rights, as
opposed to doing so directly. Certainly where basic individual rights are clearly and
directly restricted, even when due to a legislature's effort to protect other rights, the
courts should independently review the facts to be sure the law rests upon a legitimate
factual basis, rather than purely upon bias or upon unsupported or untested
assumptions.
Beyond the context of individual rights, commentators have raised arguments in
favor of deference to legislative fact-finding that may apply more broadly when basic
individual rights are not infringed. 249 If courts were to scrutinize closely as a routine
245. Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 10, at 142 (citing Post & Siegel, supra note 244, at 501,
513-22).
246. See Fallon, supra note 230, at 1712-13. Rather, in such cases, a legislature may well be
acting to ameliorate societal and government-inflicted harm to minorities. See, e.g., Kramer,
supra note 10, at 148-50 (describing "massive" congressional record supporting the Americans
with Disabilities Act and revealing "pandemic, society-wide discrimination" and "pervasive
mistreatment by state and local governments").
247. Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 10, at 120.
248. See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 336-39 (2003).
249. See, e.g., Bryant & Simeone, supra note 10; Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 10, at 90-
91, 120, 135 (arguing the Court's recent refusal to defer to congressional fact-finding in
Enforcement and Commerce Clause cases amounts to an "unworkable judicial arrogation of
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matter the factual bases for all exercises of legislative power, the principle of
separation of powers could be undermined and the legislatures' ability to act unduly
hampered.250 Moreover, the nature of the legislative process may make it hopeless to
expect that every piece of legislation will be based upon a close review of the facts.2 5 1
The pursuit of a perfect factual foundation in the legislative setting may simply be too
unrealistic and too costly.252 Under this view, if democratically elected officials want to
take action based on an imperfect assessment of the relevant facts, then so be it. This
may be a cost of the democratic process that we are obliged to accept.25 3 This Article
does not answer these questions, however, for my concern here is with the comparative
merits of legislative and judicial fact-finding where basic individual rights are at stake.
I merely note that the paradigm of selective independent judicial review is flexible
enough to accommodate these concerns.
B. Competence
Superior legislative fact-finding competence is a chimera, especially when a
legislature considers a proposal that will restrict basic individual rights in a
controversial context.254 The problem is multi-layered. At the first level lie significant
structural issues. Legislators are subject to political pressures beyond their control that
are markedly different from those faced by courts, and these pressures profoundly
affect the nature of legislative fact-finding. The second level of difficulty is
legislatures' frequent failure to seize whatever opportunities and advantages they do
possess to conduct dispassionate and rigorous fact-finding. Finally, the combination of
these two problems impairs legislators' cognitive judgment, engendering mistakes in
evaluating facts. Legislatures take non-facts for facts, or they dwell on insignificant
facts. These tendencies are exacerbated when legislators consider hot-button social
issues, as the case studies in Part II demonstrate. Courts of course face their own
obstacles in evaluating facts, and their fact-finding is far from perfect.255 But in
important cases they have proven to do a better job than the legislatures, justifying a
reevaluation of deference to legislative fact-finding in these contexts.
legislative authority" and may detrimentally formalize the process of legislating); Colker &
Brudney, supra note 10. But see McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 12, at 16-17 (arguing that
courts should never defer to congressional fact-finding). David Faigman argues for a theory of
judicial deference that is tailored to how "deeply constitutional values are implicated."
FAIGMAN, supra note 24, at 130. Thus, he argues, for example, that federal courts should defer
when Congress exercises its powers under the Commerce Clause, but not when states defend
their laws as permissible under the Dormant Commerce Clause. See id. at 20.
250. Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 10, at 129.
251. See MAYHEW, supra note 117, at 122-25.
252. See McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 12, at 3 ("As an elected body, Congress is
designed to respond to its constituents; subjective desires, not to the objective facts of the
world.").
253. Cf John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality ofReverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CmI. L.
REv. 723, 731-32 (1974) (noting that where legislative classifications are not influenced by
prejudices, "imperfect-but-plausible statistical generalizations" are "usually sufficient" for a
court to credit).
254. For an excellent summary of the forces that produce inferior fact-finding in the
legislative realm, see Laycock, supra note 230, at 1172-77.
255. See Solove, supra note 20, at 1021.
[Vol. 84:1
RETHINKING JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
A fundamental strain imposed on the legislative fact-finding process is the
politically driven and controlled legislative agenda. The conventional wisdom that the
courts are more reactive than the legislatures does not reflect political reality, whether
in the states or in Congress. Legislatures simply face different causal pressures.
Legislators are driven, some argue almost exclusively, by the desire for reelection. 2 56
They are disproportionately influenced by interest groups, and must also respond to
constituents, their party, and the President. This naturally limits their incentives to
determine which problems really need a legislative response. Instead, in setting their
agenda, they tend to focus on "problems" that further their political interests. They are
likely to craft "solutions" to hot-button issues that will garner them prominent and
positive press coverage and placate clamoring special interests.25 7
Once the legislative agenda is thus set, the train is in motion, and legislators have
little incentive to stop it in the fact-finding process. The fact-finding they conduct
through committee hearings is much less a search for the truth than a carefully
choreographed dance designed to maximize whatever benefits the legislator stands to
reap, 258 whether advertising, credit-claiming, or position-taking (which often includes
expressing public approbation or outrage over an issue).259 Legislative fact-finding
therefore too readily mirrors unreasoned public hysteria and fear. As Justice Brandeis,
cautioning against ready acceptance of a law's factual basis in the face of widespread
public fear, reminded, "[m]en feared witches and burnt women."260 The very conduct
of the committee hearings undermines any serious examination of the facts; attendance
is often poor, and during the testimony legislators frequently talk to one another,
wander in and out to take phone calls, and engage in side conversations with their
staff.261
Because courts do not set their own agendas, they have less reason to stage a
predetermined factual outcome. This is particularly true of the federal trial judges,
whose role is not to establish or revisit precedent, but to apply it.262 Thus, far from
undermining the integrity of their fact-finding, the reactive nature of the trial courts
frees them from a slavish devotion to a pre-set political agenda.263 It also makes the
courts more responsive. As one commentator notes, in the judicial setting, "questions
256. See MAYHEW, supra note 117, at 7-33 (explaining that as members of the most
professionalized legislature in the world, members of Congress must constantly focus on
reelection in order to continue their careers).
257. See id., at 49-75 (discussing advertising and credit-claiming).
258. See generally ERIC REDMAN, THE DANCE OF LEGISLATION (1973).
259. See MAYHEw, supra note 117, at 49, 52, 60, 106.
260. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
261. See Laycock, supra note 230, at 1174-75.
262. Although it too is a reactive body, the Supreme Court obviously has a greater
opportunity to set its agenda through the certiorari process. This is not to suggest, however, that
the federal district courts retain no discretion in applying the law. See generally Pauline T. Kim,
Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (2007).
263. See Ginsburg, supra note 230, at I (recounting comments by Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist comparing the role of a judge "to that of a referee in a basketball game who is obliged
to call a foul against a member of the home team at a critical moment in the game: he will be
soundly booed, but he is nonetheless obliged to call it as he saw it, not as the home crowd wants
him to call it" (citing William H. Rehnquist, Act Well Your Part: Therein All Honor Lies, 7
PEPI. L. REV. 227, 229-30 (1980))).
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get answers. ' ,264 Moreover, federal judges' life-tenure appointments insulate them from
concern that the public will not agree with their factual determinations. Of course,
judges can be opinionated and result-driven, especially when confronted with
controversial topics. But the question raised by the doctrine of judicial deference is
whether they are more or less so than legislators. The case studies confirm that they
are, on the whole, less so.
Aside from the counterproductive force of agenda-setting, the legislative process
itself impedes fair fact-finding. In a committee, the committee chair specifically, and
the controlling party more generally, play both advocate and judge. 265 The timing and
structure of the hearing, the balance of testimony on each side, and the treatment of the
witnesses who testify are all subject to manipulation by the committee chair. Not only
do the chair and the controlling party have a tactical advantage in the conduct of the
committee hearing, but if any formal "findings" are included in the body of the
legislation, they are likely the ones who will draft them. Even disregarding the issue of
bias, those "findings" are part of a political process ofcompromise and expediency that
undermines their reliability.26 6
While it is true that legislators, especially those serving on certain congressional
committees, may specialize, this specialization is unlikely to be of help in resolving
many of the factual questions raised by legislation affecting individual rights. In the
three case studies presented, there was virtually no institutional advantage in terms of
expertise that Congress or state legislatures, as compared with the courts, brought to
bear on the deliberations. Moreover, even if legislators possess relevant expertise, they
are unlikely to employ that expertise toward neutral, comprehensive fact-finding.
Instead, they are much more likely to be motivated by electability and interest group
pressure. 267 Conversely, the conception of the "generalist judge" may be overstated in
today's federal judiciary.268
Even if the committee process were to produce sound fact-finding, this fact-finding
is unlikely to form the basis of decision by the entire body. Those who hear the"evidence" are a tiny percentage of those who ultimately approve the final measures,
and the vast majority of legislators are unlikely to pay careful attention to committee
264. HoRowrrz, supra note 8, at 22.
265. Legislatures are sometimes characterized as neutral because they act on behalf of their
constituents. This is an idealized characterization, however. It ignores the partisan realities of
legislatures. It also overlooks the fact that legislators are often personally invested in their
legislative agendas. See generally MAYHEW, supra note 117. Moreover, by acting on behalf of
one set of constituents, a legislature takes sides, particularly if the measure in question
implicates other constituents' constitutional rights.
266. See BAMBERGER, supra note 209, at 9 ("A significant part of the political process is
accommodation and compromise."); Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 10, at 95 ("In the
legislative setting, no such unitary decision maker accepting evidence and explaining policy
choices is likely to exist. The concepts of 'admissible' evidence or 'ex parte' contacts simply do
not fit the kind of polycentric and informal political process that generates legislation.").
267. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence ofPublic Choice, 65 TEX.
L. REv. 873, 891 (1987). See generally MAYHEW, supra note 117.
268. See Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2009), available at http://works.bepress.com/edward-cheng/1/) (arguing that
empirical evidence demonstrates that "opinion specialization [is] an unmistakable part of
everyday judicial practice, suggesting that the generalist judge is largely a myth").
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reports and other evidence entered into the legislative record.269 In fact, the more
thorough the fact-finding, the less likely that legislators will take the time to absorb it.
The judicial process, in contrast, is designed to optimize fairness. 270 The setting is
sober and respectful, in contrast to legislative hearings, and departures from judicial
norms and protocols are taken seriously.27' There is no built-in opportunity for bias in
the number of witnesses that may be called, the amount of time for which they may
testify, the schedule the parties must follow, and so on. The process is accessible and
evenhanded, and the "precise steps [are] spelled out in advance." 272 When basic
individual rights are targeted by legislation, those whose rights are in question tend to
be in the political minority and therefore cannot count on the legislative process to
protect them. To grant "unfettered deference" to legislative fact-finding in these
circumstances would leave "legislative foxes guarding the constitutional henhouse." 273
It is telling that, when our own rights are at stake, most of us insist upon judicial
resolution of our grievances and would never think of entrusting them to a legislature.
Moreover, although some commentators emphasize the constraining nature of the
rules of evidence and other judicial norms and procedures, these do serve to weed out
the inflammatory rhetoric that is part and parcel of both committee proceedings and
floor debates (and that grows only more frenzied when unpopular rights or minorities
274 275are implicated).274 It also ensures that exogenous political influences hold less sway.
In the legislative context, the airing of public opinion and constituent input may well be
healthy and valuable for other reasons. But it does not tend to make for good fact-
finding, as the case studies show.
While it is true that courts are somewhat at the mercy of the evidence the parties
bring to them,276 it is far from clear that this system undermines judicial fact-finding, at
least as compared to the legislatures. The adversary process helps to ensure that all
plausible arguments, including the relevant factual support, will be brought before the
269. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent andPublic Choice, 74 VA.
L. REv. 423, 444-45 (1988); see also Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 10, at 96 ("Committee
hearing transcripts and reports... reveal little aboutwhat the enacting coalition of legislators...
actually considered."). Indeed, legislators often cannot even be bothered, or lack the time, to
read the legislation itself in its entirety. See, e.g., Robin Toner & Neil A. Lewis, A Nation
Challenged: Congress; House Passes Terrorism Bill Much Like Senate's, but with 5-Year Limit,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2001, at B6 (discussing failure of lawmakers to read USA PATRIOT Act
before its passage).
270. See Laycock, supra note 230, at 1176; CHOPER, supra note 230, at 68-69.
271. See Laycock, supra note 230.
272. HoRowrrz, supra note 8, at 22.
273. Faigman et al., supra note 11, at 84.
274. Some commentators have questioned the very notion of a "legislative record." They
argue that a "record" implies a compilation produced as the culmination of a legal process, a
description that does not reflect the reality of legislative fact-finding and the legislative process
in general. Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 10, at 92.
275. See HoRowrrz, supra note 8, at 23 (noting minimal influence of the National
Education Association inLau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), and of the National Association
of Manufacturers in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)).
276. See FAIGMAN,supra note 24, at 100 ("[N]o court should rely on the parties exclusively
to say what the reviewable facts are.").
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court.277 Furthermore, in the context of constitutional challenges alleging violations of
basic individual rights, courts are not as constrained by procedural and substantive
limitations as some critics claim. The facts relevant to the courts' determinations tend
overwhelmingly to be social facts. Courts commonly apply hearsay and other
evidentiary rules to such evidence (and, I would argue, this is often for the better).278
But they are not required to do so. 279 Judges may, and should, hire their own experts
and consult outside sources if the parties' submissions are lacking.280
277. HOROWITZ, supra note 8, at 22; see also McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 12, at 25-
29. It has been argued that expert witnesses are inherently partisan, and that their tendency is to
simplify, and even to mislead the decision maker. See HoRowITz, supra note 8, at 26. But this
concern is surely equally if not more apt in the legislative setting. Indeed, the rules of evidence
help to ensure that, in court, the testimony of purely partisan witnesses who have little expertise
or only questionable data to contribute will either be barred or be deemed not credible.
278. The rules of evidence ensure a certain minimum threshold for the reliability of
testimony. Although social facts are understood to be treated more leniently than adjudicative
facts under the Federal Rules of Evidence, see FED. R. EVID. 201 (a) advisory committee's note;
Kenneth Culp Davis, supra note 8, at 402-07; Kenneth Culp Davis, Fact in Lawmaking, 80
CoLuM. L. REv. 931, 940-41 (1980); Levin, supra note 121, at 321-22, trial courts often
enforce the rules even with respect to evidence that qualifies as social facts. This is reflected in
the transcripts of the "partial-birth abortion" ban trials. See, e.g., Trial Transcript, R.I. Med.
Soc'y v. Pine, No. C.A. 97-416-L (D.R.I. May 5, 1999); see also FAIGMAN, supra note 24, at
99-100 (raising the question "whether evidence of constitutional reviewable facts should be
assessed for validity and, if so, by what standards this should be done" and suggesting that the
Daubert approach "should inform judicial reception of evidence regarding constitutional
reviewable facts").
It may well be that the distinct procedural treatment of social and adjudicative facts is ill-
advised and less likely to produce scientifically sound fact-finding. See, e.g., Monahan &
Walker, supra note 27, at 485; Rachael N. Pine, Speculation and Reality: The Role of Facts in
Judicial Protection of Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 655, 697-98 (1988). An
extended treatment of these issues is beyond the scope of this Article. Whatever shortcomings
may result from the courts' differential treatment of legislative and adjudicative facts, these
limitations do not compare to the biases and inaccuracies inherent in the legislative process. Cf
HOROWlTZ, supra note 8, at 24 ("The point can surely be made that, if courts cannot do certain
things well, other institutions may perform the same tasks even less capably .... On some
matters, an imperfect judicial performance may be the best that is currently available .... ).
279. Kenneth Culp Davis, supra note 8, at 402-07; Levin, supra note 121, at 321-22; see
also Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("This Court, too, could have
called for amicus briefs on the statistical question (or accepted the brief that was offered) and
our failure to do so looks less than sporting, since our decision seems to turn on the absence of
them.") (Mikva, J., dissenting).
280. Judicial fact-finding will also be affected to some degree by the relative resources the
parties can bring to bear. However, social fact-finding in the courts often occurs in the context
of facial constitutional challenges, in which public interest advocacy groups, staffed with
lawyers who have experience litigating such cases, are likely to intervene. The availability of
attorneys' fees to lawyers representing clients pro bono in constitutional challenges helps to
alleviate the financial concern. See HoRowrrz, supra note 8, at 11. In any event, these potential
shortcomings of the adversarial system are not cured in the legislative process. Federal courts
observing that a disparity in resources is skewing the fact-finding again should make use of
other available resources for supplementing the factual record.
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Finally, it does not even appear that legislatures are more efficient fact-finders than
trial courts. Indeed, the vagaries of the political process, the flexibility inherent in
legislative fact-finding, and legislators' personal and political motivations may
encourage inefficiency. Congressional hearings on the federal "Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act," spanned eight years. In contrast, many of the state ban trials took less than a
week. The trial in Nebraska federal district court on the federal ban281 took only two
weeks and produced a factual record that not only overlapped substantially with
Congress's282 but in significant respects was more complete. 28 3 And while the
adversarial process in the judicial setting tends to produce better fact-finding, it also
can encourage the parties to stipulate to facts that are important but not in dispute,
helping to establish a solid factual foundation in an efficient manner.284 There is no
equivalent process, and indeed no incentive for such a process, in the legislative
setting.
The trial courts' advantages in fact-finding are not all replicated at the appellate
level, however. Appellate courts can find themselves on thin factual ice if they misuse
their freedom to rely on social facts not developed by the parties at the trial level.285
For example, in most of Carhart II, the Court relied on the "extensive evidence"
developed by the three trial courts, 286 and in particular upon their "exhaustive"
descriptions of abortion procedures. But one section of the opinion veered onto a topic
not raised by the bans and therefore not covered by the district courts' fact-finding-
whether women "come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created
and sustained" and experience "[s]evere depression and loss of esteem."287 To reach
this factual conclusion, Justice Kennedy resorted to an amicus brief submitted by
Sandra Cano, the "Doe" of Doe v. Bolton288 who now claimed to regret her abortion,
and "180 post-abortive women who have suffered the adverse emotional and
psychological effects of abortion., 289
281. Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 809 (D. Neb. 2004).
282. See Brief of Respondents at 1-11, Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart I1), 127 S. Ct. 1610
(2007) (No. 05-380), 2006 WL 2345934.
283. See id.; Carhart, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 960, 979-82 (citing both the Chasen Study and
medical school data); Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(noting the district court "heard more evidence during its trial than Congress heard over the span
of eight years").
284. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (relying upon the
parties' stipulations for a significant number of the court's findings of fact).
285. See FAIGMAN, supra note 24, at 98 ("On appeal, ... courts routinely accept amicus
briefs chock-full of factual assertions from interested parties who might, or might not, have
expertise on the subject.... Historically, there has been no practice or tradition that reviewable
facts be introduced at trial and survive the rigors of the adversarial process."); Hashimoto, supra
note 27, at 114, 149-52 (arguing that Supreme Court tends "to be result-oriented in deciding
which scientific facts to include and in what manner they should be used"). For this reason, I
depart from Neal Devins' suggestion that to critique Congress's fact-finding is to imply that "the
Supreme Court is a better factfinder than Congress." Devins, supra note 22, at 1176 (emphasis
added).
286. Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart I), 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1620 (2007).
287. Id. at 1634.
288. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
289. Brief of Sandra Cano et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 2, Gonzales v.
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Moreover, if appellate procedural rules help to ensure a level of fairness and
consistency that the legislative setting cannot provide, an appellate court's review of a
dry, written record cannot match a trial court's immediate contact with the witnesses.
Even with respect to social facts, witnesses' credibility is often reflected at least partly
in their demeanor. Hearing the testimony live, and being able to pose questions to the
witnesses if necessary, also helps the trial judge more readily absorb and internalize the
information.
This advantage was demonstrated in the "partial-birth abortion" trials, where the
trial judges as a whole generally grasped the significance of the bans' vague wording
and the difficulties the language posed for medical practice. The Supreme Court
Justices also learned a remarkable amount about abortion procedures and obstetric and
gynecological practice and medical conditions, certainly more than most of the
legislators who debated the bans.290 Nevertheless, Justice Stevens, who had dissented
vigorously from the majority's upholding of the federal "Partial Birth Abortion Ban
Act" in Gonzales v. Carhart, made a revealing comment in an interview following the
Court's decision. Asked about the federal ban's impact, "Stevens... noted that the
real-world effect of the defeat was minimal because of the widespread availability of
alternative abortion procedures. 'The statute is a silly statute,' he said... ,but what we
decided isn't all that important.,,, 29' This remark contrasts sharply with the concerns of
those who represent abortion providers that the threat of criminal liability and
uncertainty about the ban's meaning will create a chilling effect on doctors that will
ultimately harm women.292
IV. REEVALUATING JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO LEGISLATIVE FACT-FINDING WHEN
BASIC INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS ARE AT STAKE
A. A Paradigm of Selective Independent Judicial Review
Commentators who recognize the shortcomings of legislative fact-finding have
proposed solutions that vary widely in how far they deviate from current practice. 293
Carhart (Carhart II), 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) (No. 05-380), 2006 WL 1436684; see CarhartII,
127 S. Ct. at 1634; infra text accompanying note 294.
290. Compare supra text accompanying notes 149-50, with supra text accompanying notes
126-40, 149-54.
291. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, §6 (Magazine), at 50
(interview of Justice John Paul Stevens) (emphasis added).
292. E.g., Megan Hughes, Reproductive Rights LitigatorDiscusses Carhart's Impact, HARv.
L. REc., Oct. 4, 2007, available at
http://media.www.hlrecord.org/media/storage/paper609/news/2007/10/04/News/Reproductive.
Rights.Litigator.Discusses.Caharts.Impact-3015481.shtml (summarizing a talk by Priscilla Smith,
lead attorney for plaintiff in Carhart 11).
293. See, e.g., FAIGMAN, supra note 24, at 132-33 (court should review legislature's
constitutional fact-finding where "basic constitutional values," including "basic liberties" and
"structural barriers," are implicated); Devins, supra note 22, at 1176 (noting that Court should
"act cautiously before embracing fact-dependent standards of review"); Faigman, et al., supra
note 11, at 82 (arguing that court should not defer where strict or heightened scrutiny applies or
when "specially protected rights" are burdened); Hill, supra note 176, at 337-41 ("[C]ourts
should not defer to legislative findings of medical fact."); McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 12,
at 43 (stating that courts should never defer to legislative fact-finding, and both trial and
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There has been scant focus, however, on the particular competence of trial courts (as
contrasted with appellate courts), and on the particular importance of judicial fact-
finding in the context of all basic individual rights, including emerging rights not
accorded strict scrutiny. Moreover, some commentators, viewing deference as an all or
nothing proposition, fear that blanket independent judicial review will unduly hamper
Congress and the legislatures.294 I propose a paradigm of selective independent judicial
review that addresses all of these concerns.
Scholars have often pointed out that the divide between law and fact is problematic,
and some have linked this observation to a critique of deference to legislative fact-
finding. 295 But these scholars' arguments do not focus specifically upon dispositive
social facts.29 6 I argue that courts are better at evaluating the dispositive social facts
underlying laws that infringe basic individual rights. In the "partial-birth abortion"
context, Congress's conclusions that its ban needed no health exception and did not
impose an undue burden rested upon factual assumptions about the relative safety and
availability of abortion procedures and other issues. As the "partial-birth abortion" ban
trials demonstrated, the trial courts did a far better job of amassing and analyzing these
kinds of empirical facts. The trial courts' superior competence in dispositive social
fact-finding demonstrates how important it is that they independently review such facts
where significant individual rights are at stake. Had the Supreme Court given adequate
weight to the trial courts' fact-finding on the federal abortion ban-which led all three
district courts to declare the ban unconstitutional-it would almost certainly have
reached a different outcome. 29 7
Under the paradigm of selective independent judicial review, trial courts should
conduct a de novo review of the underlying social facts whenever a plaintiffclaims that
legislation violates her basic individual rights.298 Thus, the government should be
required to present, in court, evidence demonstrating the claimed factual basis for the
law. If the government chooses, it may rely upon the legislative record in lieu of
presenting witnesses and introducing documentary evidence. And a court should
always be free to consider the legislative record, if there is one, for what it is worth.
But evidence from the legislative record should never be considered presumptively
valid. Instead, the court should review the record skeptically and with attention to the
appellate courts should conduct de novo review of all social facts); Tobin, supra note 58, at 139
(noting that judicial deference "should not be applied when the substance of abortion informed
consent laws are challenged"); Note, Deference to Legislative Fact Determinations in First
Amendment Cases After Turner Broadcasting, Ill HARv. L. REv. 2312 (1998) (noting that in
First Amendment context, Court properly defers to fact-finding where heightened scrutiny
applies but not where strict scrutiny applies).
294. See Solove, supra note 20, at 1004-05 (describing arguments).
295. See, e.g., Devins, supra note 22 (arguing that, because line separating law from fact is
"indeterminate," and because Court is unlikely to depart from traditionalist view that places
finding of social facts within the realm of lawmaking power, Court should embrace fact-
dependent standards of review with caution); McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 12 (arguing that
law is a social fact and thus, since courts should not defer in matters of legal interpretation, they
should not defer on any social fact-finding); Pilchen, supra note 22; supra text accompanying
notes 20-23.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
297. Compare Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II), 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007), with Stenberg v.
Carhart (Carhart 1), 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
298. See supra Part III.A.
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legislative context and procedural particularities that are likely to affect the reliability
of the evidence.
Appellate courts applying selective independent review should give great weight to
the factual determinations of the trial court, applying something akin to the clearly
erroneous standard. Although this standard technically does not apply to a trial court's
determinations of social facts, appellate courts nonetheless often employ it anyway.
2 9
Of course, if an appellate court is presented with an issue that different trial courts have
resolved differently, it will be impossible to apply this standard to both courts, and the
court will need to undertake a more independent review of the facts.
3 00
Courts applying selective independent judicial review should refuse to defer to
legislative fact-finding whenever a basic individual right is directly implicated,
regardless of whether the Supreme Court has described the right as "fundamental" and
regardless of the tier of constitutional review it occupies. Because the paradigm does
not address the correct legal standard a court should apply, the government would still
enjoy the benefit of rational basis review where the Court has traditionally applied it.
The paradigm would, however, slightly change the defendant's burden under rational
basis review. Rather than assigning a plaintiff the impossible task of disproving every
conceivable factual basis for a law, the paradigm would require the government to
submit evidence to support the factual basis for its policy choice. The application of a
lenient legal standard would continue to give the government a decided advantage in
defending a law.30' Still, uncoupling legal standards of review from deference to
legislative fact-finding would ensure that, whatever legal standard a court applied to
determine whether basic individual rights were violated, that standard was applied to a
sound factual record. Misguided laws that irrationally infringe individual rights like
those of lesbian and gay parents would more likely be halted.30 2
299. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 467 F.3d 716, 723 (8th Cir. 2006)
(applying clearly erroneous standard in context of facial challenge to "informed consent" law for
abortion), rev'd en banc on other grounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008); see also Carhart 11,
127 S. Ct. at 1640 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (referencing clearly erroneous standard in
discussing trial court findings).
300. Bias can of course occur at the trial level, and a trial court may exploit flexible concepts
such as determinations of credibility in order to reach a desired outcome. See HELENA
SILVERSTEIN, GIRLS ON THE STAND: How CouRTs FAIL PREGNANT MINORS (2007) (discussing
decisions on minors' judicial bypass hearings, in which trial judges routinely characterize
minors as lacking maturity despite strong evidence to the contrary). Appellate courts should, as
always, disregard clearly false or biased trial court findings. Because procedures for admission
of evidence at the trial court level are inherently fairer and more predictable than in the
legislative setting, however, appellate courts will still gain a sounder grasp of the relevant facts
by reviewing the trial court record than by either deferring to the legislative record or straying
beyond either of these sources. See Pine, supra note 278, at 667.
301. For example, if a plaintiff driver filed an Equal Protection challenge to a requirement
that seatbelts be worn in the front seats of automobiles, the government would need to submit
some evidence that wearing seatbelts increases safety. It would not then be sufficient for the
plaintiff to prove that passengers sitting in the rear seats of cars also suffer harm. The law's
under-inclusiveness would not be constitutionally fatal under rational basis review. Moreover,
proof of a relatively modest increase in safety for front seat passengers might be sufficient.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 181-84.
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The paradigm of selective independent judicial review does not require legislatures
to make findings or develop a legislative record for every piece of legislation. It thus
should assuage concerns that the courts' failure to defer will corrupt the salutary
aspects of the legislative process. 30 3 Refusing to give deference to the legislature's fact-
finding does not mean that a court should invalidate a law simply because a thorough
legislative record was not compiled. Rather, when a law is challenged as infringing on
individual rights, a court should independently review the constitutionally relevant
facts. If the legislature should manage to engage in thorough, unbiased fact-finding, the
worst that will happen is that the factual record developed in court will mirror its
legislative counterpart. But such occasional overlap is a small price to pay to ensure
that important individual rights are fairly protected.3° Indeed, if legislatures are
encouraged to act more cautiously and fairly before treading on basic personal rights,
so much the better. 30 5
The case studies demonstrate what happens when courts defer blindly to a
legislature on the facts. Even when they raise obvious fact issues in the context of a
defendant's summary judgment motion, plaintiffs lose all opportunity to rebut a
potentially meritless "factual" claim. Moreover, particularly because legislatures are-
even under rational basis review-forbidden to enact laws based purely on animus or a
bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group,30 6 they are all the more likely to
articulate pretextual reasons for passing the legislation. Knowing they will receive
blind deference under rational basis review will only encourage legislatures to act on
pretext and without concern for the facts.
This cannot be what the Constitution condones. If we have reason to distrust
Congress's fact-finding in the context of free speech cases, then we have no more
reason to trust it in the context of other infringements on basic individual rights. Courts
cannot fulfill their duty to protect individuals from majoritarian power without the
freedom to examine the facts independently. 307 And it is unrealistic and unfair to expect
legislatures consistently to buck the political pressures of the present system and
dispassionately examine social facts in order to act as protectors of individual rights.
Where a law infringes important rights, a court should ensure that its conclusions about
the law's constitutionality rest upon a solid factual footing. Even when an asserted
basic individual right receives only rational basis review, the entire legal inquiry is a
303. See Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 10, at 94.
304. Cf Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305,331 (1985) ("Because
we do not believe the record in the District Court contradicted [the Senate Committee's]
findings, however, we need not rely on them, or determine what deference must be afforded on
this congressional record; we mention the Committee's findings only because they are entirely
consistent with our understanding of the record developed in the District Court.").
305. See CHOPER, supra note 230, at 64-70. See generally J. MITCHELL PICKERILL,
CONSTTUTONAL DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS (2004) (arguing that judicial review encourages
Congress to take more seriously constitutional issues implicated by proposed legislation).
306. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1995); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 473 (1985).
307. See Faigman, et al., supra note 11, at 90-91; McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 12, at
9-10.
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sham if the court reaches its legal conclusions through resort to a wholly speculative set
of facts.3"'
Paradoxically, the Supreme Court's approach to congressional fact-finding recently
has been directly counter to what I propose. The Court has viewed congressional
factual records with greater skepticism in cases where Congress has sought to protect
or enhance individual rights. In Board of Trustees of University ofAlabama v. Garrett,
for example, Justice Breyer argued in dissent that the Court should have deferred to
Congress's decision to allow individuals to sue states for money damages in federal
court under the Americans with Disabilities Act, noting that the ADA "does not
discriminate against anyone, nor does it pose any threat to basic liberty. 30 9
Conversely, in Carhart II, the Supreme Court implicitly deferred to Congress's fact-
finding, even though the federal ban implicated a woman's right to abortion. 3'0 In Part
IV.B, I demonstrate how the paradigm of selective independent judicial review might
affect the Supreme Court's approach to legislative fact-finding.
B. Applying the Paradigm
The federal "Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act" provides a helpful model to illustrate
the "selective" aspect of my proposed paradigm. In Carhart II, plaintiffs' claim
addressed only whether Congress, in enacting the federal abortion procedure ban, had
violated the right to abortion. The plaintiffs did not challenge Congress's authority to
act,3 " and the Court avoided the issue in its decision. 312 Under the paradigm of
selective independent judicial review, were the Court to decide this question, it might
still defer to the factual underpinnings of Congress's judgment concerning the
appropriate exercise of its power.313
308. Although it may appear that this proposal would open the door to searching review of
the factual basis for litigation in countless cases, this concern is unwarranted. As some
commentators have pointed out:
[M]any scholars conclude that the Court rarely intervenes on behalf of minorities
against the majority's will. Whether judicial review protects minority rights well or
poorly, most matters of government policy do not involve fundamental
constitutional rights or provable discrimination and are therefore subject to
unrestricted majoritarian control.... The Federal Constitution as interpreted by
the Supreme Court, leaves even discrete and insular minorities to fight [most
policy issues] out in the majoritarian political process.
Gabriel J. Chin & Randy Wagner, The Tyranny of the Minority: Jim Crow and the Counter-
Majoritarian Difficulty, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 65, 74-75 (2008) (citation omitted).
309. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,387 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
310. See supra text accompanying notes 155-57.
311. Some amicus briefs did address the issue. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae California
Medical Association in Support of Respondents, Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood, 547 U.S.
1205 (2006) (No. 05-1382), 2006 WL 2725689 (arguing that Congress exceeded its powers
under the Commerce Clause in enacting the ban).
312. But see Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart I1), 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1640 (2007) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
313. See Pilchen, supra note 22, at 384-85 (arguing that whether an activity is sufficiently
tied to interstate commerce is more a question of policy than of fact).
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As to the medical facts underlying the actual challenge, however, the Carhart II
Court should not have implicitly deferred to Congress, since the decision implicated
essential individual rights of women and physicians. 314 The majority opinion's long
description of abortion procedures incorporated the factual findings of the three trial
courts. But its ultimate conclusions did not. While Justice Kennedy did not fully credit
Congress's findings (since some of them had been proven false), he essentially called a
draw, and then sided as a legal matter with Congress, allowing the ban to be upheld.
Had the Court not deferred to Congress, the weight of the evidence clearly would have
favored the plaintiffs, and the Court would have been compelled to reach a decision
consonant with its ruling invalidating the Nebraska ban in Carhart L
Carhart 11 raises other possible applications for selective independent judicial
review. While the federal ban was being litigated, Planned Parenthood Minnesota v.
Rounds315 was filed challenging a South Dakota "informed consent" law that requires
physicians to tell their abortion patients that the fetus is a "whole, separate, unique,
living human being" and that abortion carries a significant risk of psychological trauma
to the woman. 3 1 6 The law was enacted as part of a concerted campaign in South Dakota
to introduce legislation premised on abortion's harm to women. 31 7 As part of these
efforts, the South Dakota legislature also appointed a task force to conduct fact-finding
documenting alleged abortion-related emotional trauma. 318 The work of this task force
was alarmingly biased, so much so that even the anti-abortion chair of the task force
"voted against [it] to publicize her objections". 319 A panel of the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the district court's ruling that the ban was unconstitutional, but the
court granted en banc review. The en banc court had not yet decided Rounds when the
Supreme Court issued its opinion in Carhart 11.320
In Carhart 11, a portion of Justice Kennedy's opinion seemed to signal to the Eighth
Circuit the Supreme Court's receptiveness to the South Dakota law, even though the
314. The physicians alleged that the criminal ban violated their rights to due process because
it was unconstitutionally vague. See Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. at 1614.
315. Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 375 F. Supp. 2d 881 (D.S.D. 2005), vacated and
remanded by Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
316. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2005); see Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of
Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L.
REV. 991, 1006-14 (describing South Dakota task force findings that the South Dakota
legislature relied upon in enacting an abortion ban); Reva B. Siegel & Sarah Blustain, Mommy
Dearest?, AM. PROSPECT, Oct. 21, 2006, at 22. See generally Robert Post, Informed Consent to
Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv.
939 (discussing the South Dakota statute).
317. See Siegel, supra note 316; Siegel & Blustain, supra note 316.
318. H.B. 1233, 80th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2005); S.D. TASK FORCE TO STUDY
ABORTION, REPORT OF THE SOUTH DAKOTA TASK FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION (2005), available at
http://www.voteyesforlife.com/docs/TaskForceReport.pdf; see also Siegel, supra note 316, at
1011; Reva B. Siegel, The Right's Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-
Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1644-51 (2008); Siegel & Blustain,
supra note 316.
319. Siegel, supra note 316, at 1681.
320. The en banc court heard oral arguments in Rounds on April 11, 2007, one week before
the Supreme Court issued its decision in Carhart II. The Rounds court issued its en banc
decision June 27, 2008. Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008).
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issue was not before the Court. 32 1 The opinion claimed that it was "unexceptionable" to
conclude that abortion could cause "[s]evere depression and loss of [selfl esteem,"
although it conceded that the Court had seen "no reliable data to measure the
phenomenon. 322 In fact, Justice Kennedy in essence gave deference to the fact-finding
of South Dakota's task force, relying on an amicus brief submitted in Carhart II that
contained testimonials also featured in the task force's report.3 23
Rounds presents an interesting example for testing the paradigm of selective
independent judicial review. By forcing physicians to deliver an ideological message to
their patients, the South Dakota law implicates physicians' First Amendment rights to
free speech.324 The state argued that the required statements about the embryo or fetus
were purely scientific, but the Eighth Circuit panel refused to defer to this claim,
finding that it was the district court's obligation to decide "the objective scientific and
medical accuracy of the statements in the required disclosures."325 The panel concluded
that the message consisted of ideological views susceptible of empirical proof.3 26 The
panel also declined to defer to the legislature's claims that the law was necessary to
protect "maternal psychological health." '327 Yet Carhart II seemed to encourage the
Eighth Circuit en banc court to accept unblinkingly the South Dakota task force's
conclusions.
Indeed, when the Eighth Circuit issued its en banc ruling, 32 8 it followed the Supreme
Court's encouragement. The en banc court purported to issue a decision based simply
on an "error of law" the district court committed when it ignored the statutory
definition of "human being" in deciding that the state-imposed lecture violated
physicians' free speech rights. But to find that the mandated script consisted of medical
facts, not ideology, the court could not avoid delving into the factual issues. The court
first quoted at length Justice Kennedy's passage in Carhart II (which relied upon the
South Dakota task force's narratives) averring that women require certain information
about abortion in order to avoid "severe depression and loss of esteem. 3 29 The Eighth
Circuit then stated that, "while the State cannot compel an individual simply to speak
the State's ideological message, it can use its regulatory authority to require a physician
321. Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart I1), 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1634 (2007).
322. Id.
323. See id. at 1645.
324. See Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 467 F.3d 716,727 (8th Cir. 2006), rev 'den
banc, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008); see also Post, supra note 316, at 957-60.
325. Rounds, 467 F.3d at 723.
326. All the same, "the state officials characterized these three challenged disclosures as
statements of medical and scientific fact which are necessary to give complete and accurate
information to women contemplating abortion." Id. at 720; see also Goldberg, supra note 47, at
1974 (discussing how courts and litigants often blur the lines between empirical "thin" facts and
morally laden "thick" facts).
327. See Rounds, 467 F.3d at 724, 728 (discounting relevance of the testimony of former
abortion patients before the South Dakota legislature). The court did not probe deeply into the
state's assertion that, without the state-mandated information, abortion patients would suffer
psychological trauma. The court was addressing whether a preliminary injunction issued by the
district court was proper, and the procedural posture of the case limited the court of appeals'
inquiry. See id. at 723.
328. Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008).
329. Id. at 734 (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart fl), 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1634 (2007)).
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to provide truthful, non-misleading information relevant to a patient's decision to have
an abortion." 330 In deciding whether the required statement was truthful and non-
misleading, the court deferred to the state, finding that "the biological sense in which
the embryo or fetus is whole, separate, unique and living should be clear in context to a
physician.",33' The court further found that "this biological information about the fetus
is... relevant to the patient's decision to have an abortion." 332
The dissent criticized the majority's deference to the legislature on both points. It
argued that the majority should not have deferred to the legislature's dubious findings
regarding the psychological consequences of abortion:
Although legislative factfinding is reviewed under a deferential standard, courts
retain "an independent constitutional duty to review factual findings where
constitutional rights are at stake." The legislative determinations with respect to
the state's view that abortion results in significantly increased risks of depression
or even suicide are highly questionable in light of medical studies in the United
States and abroad which have refuted the theory that women undergoing abortions
suffer from long term emotional harm or are more at risk than women who carry
their pregnancy to term.333
It also bemoaned the court's assumption that the required language conveyed
plainly biological information and nothing more. The plaintiffs' witnesses had testified
that there was no "medical consensus that a full set of DNA constitutes a 'whole,
separate, unique, living human being.' 3 4 But the majority improperly ignored this
testimony in its haste to defer to the legislature's questionable "factual" claim. As the
dissent emphasized,
[a]lthough a legislature may choose to give words its own unique definition, it
cannot establish by fiat that the term "human being" has only biological
connotations, for the constitutional analysis of whether the mandated statements
convey factual truths or contestable ideology is not controlled by the wording of
the Act. It is the role of the judiciary, rather than the legislature, to determine
whether speech and speech regulations implicate the First Amendment.3 5
Voter identification laws present another occasion for considering the paradigm of
selective independent judicial review. In Crawford v. Marion County Election
Board,336 the Supreme Court upheld an Indiana law that requires voters to show
government-issued photo identification when voting in person.: The purported basis
for the law-and presumably the public concern raised in the legislative proceedings-
was the need to prevent voter fraud.338
330. Id. at 734-35 (emphasis added).
331. Id. at 736.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 750 (quoting Carhart I, 127 S. Ct. at 1637).
334. Id. at 744 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
335. Id. at 744-45 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
336. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
337. Id.
338. Indiana does not keep legislative histories of its statutes. Telephone Interview with
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At both the trial and appellate levels, the courts simply assumed that voter fraud
among in-person voters was an actual problem in Indiana. 339 The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants, summarizing in a seventy-page opinion the
"deluge of data" both sides submitted to support their respective cross motions.
340
However, even though the court found that this data "paint[ed] contrasting pictures"
concerning the key factual issue--"whether in-person voter fraud is or should be a
concern in Indiana"341-it deferred to the defendants' version and granted their motion
for summary judgment, rejecting plaintiffs' plea that the court scrutinize the
government's facts more closely. Plaintiffs, who filed a cross claim for summary
judgment, asserted that many of the defendants' exhibits lacked credibility because
they were unsworn, unauthenticated, and contained hearsay.342 Judge Wood, dissenting
from the Seventh Circuit's later denial of rehearing en banc, objected to the district
court's deferential approach:
The state's justification for the new voting requirement is voter fraud [among in-
person voters]. Yet the record shows that the existence of this problem is... a"genuine issue of material fact" that may not be resolved in favor of the state in
ruling on the state's own motion for summary judgment. In fact, it appears that no
one has ever, in Indiana's history, been charged with voter fraud.... [I]n this case,
the "facts" asserted by the state in support of its voter fraud justification were
taken as true without any examination to see if they reflected reality.343
Indeed, the district judge not only dismissed the need for such a searching review but
appeared persuaded by precisely the kind of undisciplined, politically driven public
rhetoric that influences legislatures and makes their fact-finding unreliable.344
Indiana Legislative Services, State of Indiana: Legislative Services Agency (Jan. 24, 2008). The
Indiana Secretary of State issued a press release upon the bill's passage claiming credit for
advocating for the law and announcing that it "is aimed at preserving voter confidence and
promoting integrity in elections." Press Release, Indiana Secretary of State Todd Rokita, Rokita
Applauds Passage of Photo Identification Bill and Absentee Ballot Reform (Apr. 12, 2005),
available at http://www.in.gov/sos/press/2005/04122005b.html.
339. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007), aff'g Ind.
Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775 (S.D. Ind. 2006), reh 'g denied, 484 F.3d 486
(7th Cir. 2007).
340. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 784, af'd, Crawford, 472 F.3d 949.
341. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 792.
342. Id. at 843.
343. Crawford, 484 F.3d at 438-39 (Wood, J., dissenting). In his dissent from the Seventh
Circuit's panel decision, Judge Evans also took issue with the court's deference to the
government's factual justification:
The fig leaf of respectability providing the motive behind this law is that it is
necessary to prevent voter fraud-a person showing up at the polls pretending to
be someone else. But where is the evidence of that kind of voter fraud in this
record? ... [T]he defenders of this law candidly acknowledged that no one-in
the history of Indiana-had ever been charged with violating that law. Nationwide,
a preliminary report to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission has found little
evidence of the type of polling-place fraud that photo ID laws seek to stop.
Crawford, 472 F.3d at 955 (Evans, J., dissenting).
344. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. at 845 (noting the "patently obvious facts" that "voter fraud has
been a topic of national concern and that photo identification requirements... are becoming
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The Indiana law is a prime example of a political majority using its influence to
intrude on a basic individual right, the right to vote. The fact that there had never been
a single recorded instance of in-person voter fraud in Indiana underscored the
probability that the law was actually intended to disenfranchise certain types of voters
seen as unlikely to support the Republican Party.345 The courts should have required
the state to come forward with evidence of fraud to support its asserted interest, and its
failure to do so should have been taken into account in the balancing test the courts
applied. Instead, the Supreme Court joined the lower courts in simply assuming the
validity of the state's asserted interest in fraud prevention. It admitted that "[t]he record
contains no evidence of any such fraud actually occurring in Indiana at any time in its
history." 346 But, shunning its responsibility to protect "the right that is 'preservative of
all rights' ' 347 from majoritarian oppression, the Court showed no interest in
ascertaining whether the law was based on a sound factual footing.
Like Lofton, Crawford reflects a common pattern in which courts subordinate the
procedural requirements of a summary judgment motion to deference to a legislature's
view of the constitutionally relevant facts.348 Here, the government clearly did not meet
its burden under the summary judgment standard. But, equally important, the courts
should not have deferred blindly to the legislature's fact-finding because the law
implicated the individual right to vote, a "fundamental political right. '34 9 By failing to
demand evidence to show that in-person voter fraud was a problem in Indiana, the
courts abdicated their responsibility to protect the important individual rights at stake
in this case. This abdication placed its mark on the May elections that followed the
Supreme Court's decision: would-be voters whose identity was never in doubt,
including some twelve elderly nuns, were turned away for failure to present proper
identification.350 While here the right in question merited a strict legal standard of
review, basic individual rights of all stripes should be protected from laws that are
based on nothing more than a factual "fig leaf."35'
ubiquitous," and asserting that "the Court could almost take judicial notice that the topics of
voter fraud and voter suppression have been widely discussed in the national media").
345. See Crawford, 472 F.3d at 956 (Evans, J., dissenting).
346. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1619 (2008).
347. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,652 (1966) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
348. See supra text accompanying notes 174-79. In Turner II, Justice O'Connor criticized
the majority for ignoring key disputed facts in that case and upholding summaryjudgment for
the government. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner H), 520 U.S. 180, 236 (1997)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting the existence of disputed factual issues and remarking, "[w]e
are not.., at liberty to substitute speculation for evidence or to ignore factual disputes that call
the reasonableness of Congress' findings into question.").
349. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621,626 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
350. See Deborah Hastings, New ID Law Keeps Nuns from Voting, S. BEND TRIB., May 7,
2008, at B1.
351. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd. (Crawford]), 472 F.3d 949,955 (7th Cir.
2007) (Evans, J., dissenting).
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CONCLUSION
Our judicial system of fact-finding is not perfect, but it is the one we created to
protect basic individual rights, and it is the one we insist upon when our own rights are
at stake. When a legislature seeks to restrict important personal rights, it possesses
neither the institutional legitimacy nor the superior competence that would justify
judicial deference to its fact-finding. In contexts ranging from abortion to gay parenting
to indecency on the Internet, legislatures and courts tend to reach strikingly divergent
outcomes when they evaluate the facts that underlie rights-infringing laws. This should
not surprise us. Legislative fact-finding is, at bottom, nothing more than advocacy.
Where facts are relevant to determining whether a law violates personal rights, the
Constitution demands a more dispassionate factual assessment that only the courts can
provide.
This Article has proposed a paradigm of selective independent judicial review of
constitutionally significant social facts that would ensure rigorous, impartial fact-
finding whenever basic individual rights are at stake. The paradigm takes into account
the particular competence that trial courts (as contrasted with appellate courts) bring to
bear on their fact-finding. It also recognizes the decisive role that fact-finding plays in
the context of all basic individual rights and liberties (not just those accorded strict
scrutiny). It therefore ensures that emerging rights receive at least minimal protection
from irrational laws based not upon fact but upon political expediency and majoritarian
passions. Finally, because the paradigm does not apply across the board to
constitutional determinations, it allows courts to defer to legislative fact-finding in
other areas in which deference may be more appropriate. In particular, courts may still
show deference when legislatures seek to create or protect, rather than restrict,
individual rights.
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